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Abstract 
Existing experimental literature on risk-taking have mainly focused on choices that only 
affects the decision-maker (see e.g. the survey in Harrison & Rutström, 2008). Surprisingly 
though, the literature is scant on the fundamental question of how people behave when taking 
risk on behalf of others. One explanation might be that rational models do not make any 
predictions on standard risk-taking on behalf of others (Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2009). To 
investigate this issue further, we defined the following problem:  
Do subjects take more or less risk with other people’s money than with their own money? 
 
To better understand how people make decisions under uncertainty, we performed a survey of 
risk. Then we conducted a controlled laboratory experiment replicating Holt and Laury’s 
(2002) multiple price list (MPL) design to ensure comparability with data from previous 
experiments. The replication served as a baseline and robustness test of Chakravarty et al.’s 
(2009) findings on a Norwegian sample. The MPL design provides a simple test for risk 
aversion in which each subject is presented with ten-paired lottery choice decisions between 
the safe lottery A and the risky lottery B. We have used number of safe choices and constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) to classify the subjects’ risk attitudes. Contrary to the baseline 
experiment “Own”, subjects in the main experiment “Others” made risky choices on behalf of 
anonymous persons. 
 
The results from “Own” show that people in general are (slightly) risk-averse when making 
risky decisions over their own money, consistent with previous research (Harrison, Johnson, 
McInnes, & Rutström, 2005; Holt & Laury, 2002, 2005). We also found a significant 
treatment effect; subjects investing money on behalf of others take less risk than subjects 
investing their own money, reaffirming Chakravarty et al.’s (2009) findings. Assuming that 
the subjects distance their feelings towards outcomes, our findings support the Risk-as-
feelings hypothesis (Hsee & Weber, 1997). In order to compare in-sample responses, 
Chakravarty et al. (2009) let their subjects either make decisions over their own money first, 
and then over another person’s money, or vice versa. Thus our findings serve as a robustness 
check as different subjects performed the tasks in the baseline and main experiment. 
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1 Introduction 
The area of research in this Master Thesis is experimental economics. Experimental 
economics is a relatively new area of research, but it has blossomed in recent years (Morgan, 
2005). Nowadays economists perform hundreds of experiments every year and routinely test 
economic theories in the laboratory (Guala, 2005). Economics is an observational science and 
economic theories are devised to explain market activity (Davis & Holt, 1993). Still, 
traditional economic models lack the capacity to evaluate their predictions since they are 
founded on very subtle circumstantial and behavioural assumptions. In game theory, for 
example, these restrictive assumptions make the practical possibility of obtaining empirical 
evidence from naturally occurring markets small. As a consequence of this, a systematic 
evolution of economic theories under controlled laboratory conditions has developed. The use 
of experimental methods has become widespread in the last 20 years in order to bridge the 
gap between economic theories and observation. One of the pioneers in the field, Vernon L. 
Smith was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 2002 (jointly with Daniel 
Kahneman) “for having established laboratory experiment as a tool in empirical economic 
analysis, especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms” ("The Sveriges Riksbank 
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002," 2010). Given the ever-
growing complexity of economic models, researchers firmly believe that economics will 
increasingly become an experimental science (Davis & Holt, 1993; Plott, 1991). 
 
We have chosen decision-making under uncertainty as our main subject in this study. After 
economists noted that laboratory methods could be useful in economics, individual decision-
making experiments early become one of the distinct directions in experimental economics 
(Davis & Holt, 1993). These experiments were generally designed to examine if people 
behaved according to the axioms of the basic theory of choice under uncertainty (EUT), as 
formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Savage (1954). In experiments of 
this type, subjects have to choose between uncertain prospects or lotteries, e.g. $2 if heads or 
$1 if tails (Davis & Holt, 1993). Thus the lottery is simply a probability distribution over 
prizes with a 50 % chance of winning either $2 or $1. Although EUT has faced critique 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), we rely on this theory to 
understand how people make decisions under uncertainty.  
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Existing experimental literature on risk-taking have focused on choices that only affects the 
decision-maker (see e.g. the survey in Harrison & Rutström, 2008), and research shows that 
subjects in general tend to be risk-averse when investing money their own money (Harrison, 
et al., 2005; Holt & Laury, 2002, 2005). Surprisingly though, the literature is scant on the 
fundamental question of how people behave when taking risk on behalf of others. To our 
knowledge, only Daruvala (2007), Chakravarty et al. (2009) and Eriksen and Kvaløy (2009) 
have addressed this issue. One explanation might be that rational models do not make any 
predictions on standard risk-taking on behalf of others (Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2009). To 
investigate this issue further, we have defined the following problem: 
Do subjects take more or less risk with other people’s money than with their own money? 
 
This problem is of great current interest because it can reveal important aspects of how risk 
attitudes change when people invest money on behalf of others instead of investing their own 
money. Mutual funds may use these aspects to improve the skills of their investment 
managers and acquire a competitive advantage. If mutual funds have a better understanding of 
how to analyze their clients’ risk preferences more precisely, it should be easier to invest 
accordingly to each client’s risk profile. Again, this may result in higher customer satisfaction 
and increased revenues. Below are two grim examples where investment managers 
misinterpreted or neglected the risk preferences of their clients.  
 
Stock exchange markets are a large industry with several market participants. Mutual funds 
are sometimes accused of being irresponsible. One recent example that shed light on the 
dissatisfaction between clients and mutual funds is the conflict between eight Norwegian 
municipalities versus Terra Securities. The municipalities lost all of their investments and 
claimed a total of NOK 1.45 billions in satisfaction ("Terra-kommunene fikk 530 mill," 
2008). Terra Securities went bankrupt and the municipalities only received a total of NOK 
530 millions from the bankrupt estate. Their accumulated losses were about NOK 1 billion. 
Even though illegal investments were made by the municipalities, Terra Securities admitted 
that they did not inform the municipalities about the high risk involved in their investments 
(Lydersen & Lynum, 2007). This scandal is by far the biggest in recent Norwegian history, 
but on a daily basis investment banks face similar accusations. In an ongoing trial between 
client Petter Røeggen and investment bank DNB NOR, Røeggen claims that he thought his 
financial investments were risk-free (Sættem, 2010). Instead DNB NOR bought risky assets. 
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The examples above show that financial institutions will be the scapegoat in media if their 
investments do not match the risk profiles of their clients.  
 
The purpose of this Master Thesis is to do a robustness check of Chakravarty et al.’s (2009) 
experiment. If their findings are reaffirmed, there is a tendency to exhibit less risk aversion 
when an individual makes a decision for an anonymous stranger. Since we exclude monetary 
incentives, this implies that there must be so-called other-regarding preferences (see Fehr & 
Schmidt, 2005 for a review) that make investment managers care about their clients’ 
monetary outcome. Otherwise, investment managers would simply throw the die when 
making decisions for their clients.  
 
 
 
To obtain answer to our research problem chapter 2 presents a survey of risk-taking in order 
to understand how people make decisions under uncertainty. The survey describes expected 
utility theory (EUT), prospect theory (PT) and non-monetary motivation that affect risky 
decisions. Before the data collection, we provide a detailed description of different scientific 
methods in chapter 3. This chapter also give reasons for why we have chosen a controlled 
laboratory experiment as our research design. Chapter 4 focuses on models and techniques 
Problem 
Data collection 
Secondary data 
Data analysis 
Primary data 
Results 
Controlled laboratory 
experiment 
Survey of risk-taking 
Coding Statistical analysis 
SPSS 
Conclusion 
Figure 1 – Structure of the Master Thesis 
Lottery decision sheets 
and demographic data 
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used to measure subjects’ risk attitudes as well as detailed descriptions of how the experiment 
was designed and conducted. Then the data are analysed, results are presented and findings 
are discussed in chapter 5. Finally conclusions are drawn in chapter 6.  
2 Survey of risk-taking 
The following chapter presents different theoretical aspects that are important in order to 
understand individual’s preferences when making risky decisions on behalf of others. The 
survey starts with a presentation of the two leading theories on how to evaluate prospects 
under uncertainty, Expected utility theory (EUT) and Prospect theory (PT). We have excluded 
monetary incentives in our experiment, and the section non-monetary motivation presents 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation that might affect risky decisions. 
 
2.1 Expected utility theory (EUT) 
If the consumer has reasonable preferences about risk in different circumstances, then 
institutions will be able to use a utility function to describe these preferences. One of the most 
used methods of calculating a person’s utility can be described as an EUT function, 
sometimes called a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, (see e.g. Varian, 2006). 
According to the EUT function, an individual chooses the highest expected utility, rather than 
the highest expected value. John von Neumann, a major figure in mathematics in the twenties, 
along with Oscar Morgenstern, an economist at Princeton, developed mathematical game 
theory and are considered to be pioneers in EUT. EUT can leniently be described as the utility 
of average level of consumption that you would get. The utility of any gamble may be 
expressed as a linear combination involving only the utility of the outcomes and their 
respective probabilities (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Utility functions are also 
normally continuous functions. An example of one particularly form that the utility function 
might take is the following: 
 
 (1) 
 
The function tells us that the utility can be written as a weighted sum of some function of 
consumption in each state, v(c1) and v(c2), where the weights are given by the probabilities p1 
and p2.  
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2.1.1 Axioms 
Completeness, transitivity, reflexivity, monotonicity, convexity and continuity are six axioms 
of EUT that define a rational decision maker (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).  
 
The first axiom, completeness, assume that any two bundles can be compared, and that an 
individual has well defined preferences and can decide between them. For every bundle of c1 
and c2 either c1 < c2, c1 > c2 or c1 = c2, in which case the consumer is indifferent between the 
two bundles. If c1 is preferred to c2, then a lottery that yields c1 with probability p1 and p2 = 
(1- p1) is preferred to a lottery that yields c2 with probability p1 and p2 = (1- p1). In our 
experiment the decision maker has 10 different decisions with two different payoffs, each 
with different probabilities. Hence it is easy for the decision maker to make a choice based on 
his preferences.  
 
The second axiom transitivity assumes that if c1 > c2 > c3, then c1 > c3. As an individual 
decides according to the completeness axiom, the individual also decides consistently. In 
other words, if the consumer thinks that c1 is at least as good as c2 and c2 is at least as good as 
c3, then surely he thinks that c1 is at least as good as c3. Transitivity is referred to as the axiom 
of substitution (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). As mentioned above, the decision makers in 
our experiment have to choose which of the two risk profiles they prefer in all ten decisions. 
Participants may show inconsistent preferences. For instance, if some of the subjects start by 
choosing the risky choice, switch over to a series of safe choices and concludes with a series 
of risky choices, then the transitivity axiom is violated. 
 
Reflexivity, the third axiom, is a trivial axiom and assumes that any bundle is at least as good 
as an identical bundle (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). This axiom will not be violated 
in our experiment since there are not any identical bundles. 
 
The fourth axiom is monotonicity and assumes that more is better. This is of course when it 
comes to goods and not evils. Consumer prefers more to less of all goods. The axiom should 
hold, but often only up to the point where the good shifts to be an evil or for all goods that are 
non-satiations goods. For example, consider a little child who can have as many ice creams he 
can eat. The first two may be fantastic, but the third may be less fantastic than the previous. 
The child can after the fifth feel sick and then the good has turned evil. Thus the shape of the 
indifference curve has a negative slope. In our experiment there might be some answers that 
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violate the axiom of monotonicity, e.g. if the subjects choose lottery A over B in the last 
decision row. This implies that they prefer NOK 75, rather than NOK 145. 
 
The fifth axiom convexity refers to the property of an individual's preferences towards various 
outcomes, and assumes that average is better than extremes. For instance, imagine two 
bundles of goods on the same indifferences curve. The weighted average bundle will be at 
least as good as or strictly preferred to each of the two extreme bundles. This axiom is not 
relevant in our experiment because we are looking at decisions under uncertainty with 
monetary outcomes and not consumer goods. 
 
Continuity is the last of the six axioms and assumes that if bundle c1 is strictly preferred to c2, 
then bundles “close” to c1 should also be preferred to c2. In accordance with the convexity 
axiom, continuity is irrelevant in our case. 
 
To be able to classify an individual as rational, all the mentioned axioms above should be 
satisfied and the preferences can be represented by a utility function. Hence if an individual 
always chooses his most preferred alternative, then he will choose one gamble over another if 
and only if the expected utility of one gamble exceeds the other and thereby maximizes his 
utility. 
 
2.1.2 Risk aversion 
From microeconomic theory one assume that a consumer has reasonable preferences about 
consumption in different circumstances, and we form a utility function to describe these 
preferences (see e.g. Varian, 2006). But when considering choice under uncertainty one must 
also add the element of uncertainty to the equation. How a person values one state as 
compared to another depends on the probability that the specific state will actually occur. 
Ultimately it is the beliefs of the individual about the likelihood of each state that determine 
his preferences.  
 
In a lottery choice where one could win or lose money, the utility function will depend on 
both the probabilities and the possible gain or loss. If c1 denotes state 1 (gain) and c2 denotes 
state 2 (loss), then p1 and p2 are the probabilities that state 1 or 2 actually occurs. The 
probabilities are mutually exclusive so that p2 = (1- p1). Given this notation, the utility 
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function that represents the individual’s preference in the lottery can be written as (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944): 
 
 (2) 
 
To apply this in an example, we will look at a simple lottery choice problem (Varian, 2006). 
Let us imagine that the consumer has an initial wealth of 10 NOK. He has a 50 % chance of 
losing or winning 5 NOK, respectively. Thus his wealth after participating in the lottery will 
either be 5 NOK or 15 NOK. If he does not take part in the lottery, the expected value of his 
wealth will be equal to his initial wealth of 10 NOK. The expected utility of participating in 
the lottery is: 
 
 (3) 
 
A risk-averse person would in this case prefer to receive the expected value of his wealth with 
certainty rather than face the lottery (Grønn, 2005). In other words the utility of the expected 
value of wealth, u(10), exceeds the expected utility of wealth, 0.5u(5) + 0.5u(15). The risk-
averse consumer has a concave utility function (Varian, 2006, p. 225):  
 
Figure 2 – Risk aversion 
 
Master Thesis in Economic Analysis – Risk-taking on behalf of others: A laboratory experiment 
 
8 
 
A person with risk-neutral preferences would exclusively rank the lottery after its expected 
value, i.e. he will pick the option with the highest expected value (Grønn, 2005). Since the 
initial wealth of 10 NOK equals the expected utility of wealth, he would be indifferent 
whether to take part in the lottery or not. Hence the risk-neutral consumer’s utility function is 
linear. 
 
A risk lover prefers to participate in the lottery no matter what, even if the expected value of 
wealth is greater than the expected utility of wealth (Grønn, 2005). Hence his expected utility 
of wealth, 0.5u(5) + 0.5u(15), exceeds the utility of the expected value of wealth, u(10). A 
risk lover has a convex shaped utility function (Varian, 2006, p. 226): 
 
Figure 3 – Risk loving 
 
 
We expect different degrees of risk aversion among the subjects in our experiment. Although 
research shows great variety between subjects (see the survey in Harrison & Rutström, 2008), 
people in general tend to be (slightly) risk-averse when making decisions under uncertainty 
(Harrison, et al., 2005; Holt & Laury, 2002, 2005). However, our main research problem is to 
investigate whether people exhibit a higher or lower degree of risk aversion when making 
risky decisions on behalf of others. 
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2.2 Prospect theory (PT) 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) present a critique of EUT as a descriptive model of making 
decisions under risk and introduce an alternative theory called prospect theory (PT). PT 
presents another explanation to individual decision-making under risk and is developed for 
simple prospects with monetary outcomes and stated probabilities, even though it can be 
extended to more involved choices. There are three major ways that departs original PT from 
EUT (Harrison & Rutström, 2008):  
1. In PT there is allowance for subjective probability weighting. 
2. There is also allowance for the use of different utility functions for gains and losses 
and the use of a reference point defined over outcomes. 
3. Contrary to EUT, PT has allowance for loss aversion. Loss aversion is the concept that 
the disutility of losses weighs more heavily than the utility of comparable gains. 
 
In PT there are two phases that are important when making choices under risk, an early phase 
of editing (framing) and a subsequent phase of evaluation (valuation) (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In the editing phase, the decision maker constructs a 
representation of acts, contingencies and outcomes that are relevant for the decision. The 
editing phase is a preliminary analysis of the offered prospect and consists of the following 
actions; coding, combination, segregation and cancellation. In the evaluation phase, the 
decision maker appraises the value of each prospect and chooses accordingly.  
 
As opposed to EUT, coding refers to when individuals normally perceive outcomes as gains 
and losses, rather than final states. Every individual have their own neutral reference point 
that corresponds to the current asset position, in which case gains and losses coincide with 
actual amounts that are paid or received. Gains and losses are therefore defined relative to this 
reference point. The location of the reference point can be affected by the expectations and 
formulation of the individuals offered prospect. 
 
Combination exists when prospects with the same outcome but with different probabilities 
can be combined into a simplified prospect. For example, two prospects of winning 200 with 
a probability of 25 % (200, 0.25; 200, 0.25) can by the decision maker be evaluated in a 
reduced form (200, 0.50). 
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The segregation action happens in the editing phase when decision makers segregate riskless 
from risky components. For instance, a prospect (300, 0.80; 100, 0.20) is naturally 
decomposed into sure gain of 100 and the risky prospect (200, 0.80). 
 
Empirical evidence shows that many decision makers who participate in a sequential game 
tend to ignore the first stage if this stage is shared by both options, and base their decisions 
solely on the second stage. The evaluation phase is the second phase in PT where the edited 
prospects are evaluated, and of course the prospect of highest value is chosen. 
 
Traditionally EUT has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational choice and 
widely applied as a descriptive model of economic behaviour, but according to Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) people’s preferences systematically violate the axioms of EUT. Contrary 
to EUT they find that people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison 
with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This is called the certainty effect. The 
certainty effect violates the substitution axiom and can be exemplified by the following 
problem: 
 
Option A: 50 % chance to win 1,000  Option B: Win 450 for sure 
  50 % chance to win nothing 
 
The above problem was presented to an Israeli, a Swedish and an American sample. 
According to EUT one should expect subjects to choose option A due to a higher expected 
utility compared to option B (500>450), but the results show that the majority chose option B. 
The overweighting of certainty contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains 
and to risk-seeking in choices involving sure losses. Here is an example of the latter case: 
 
Option A: 80 % chance to lose 4000  Option B: Lose 3000 for sure 
 
Although the expected loss is less for option B (-3000), 92 % of the subject still chose option 
A (-3200). This is consistent with PT in which values are determined by gains or losses rather 
than final states, and probabilities are replaced by decision weights (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  
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2.2.1 Ambiguity aversion 
We learn that in order to evaluate different economic prospects, it is important to assume that 
every individual is homo economicus and that the marked is efficient etc. When facing a 
financial problem, standard financial theory assumes that investors behave rational (Berg, 
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) and successfully identify and process important information in 
the course of reaching the optimal decision. This view is widely applied in different schools 
of economics and is considered a paradigm. Nevertheless, a body of empirical evidence 
collected in the recent years suggest that there are systematic departures from the predicted 
behaviour of investors (Charness & Gneezy, 2003; Henrich, et al., 2001). These findings 
challenge this paradigm. 
 
Knight (1921) separates between uncertainty and risk, with risk being quantifiable in terms of 
explicit probabilities. For example, if a person attends a decision task where he is asked to 
guess which of three cups conceal a coin, the person can use mathematics to calculate the 
probability of getting the right answer the first time. In this case the probability of getting the 
right answer the first time is 33 %. In contrast you cannot calculate which colour is going to 
be the most popular car paint for the next years. When individuals show an attitude of 
preferring known risk to unknown risk, this attitude is called ambiguity aversion (Heath & 
Tversky, 1991). 
 
When buying financial assets, it is rare to know the precise probabilities. Hence ambiguity 
aversion has attracted considerable interest, even though evidence is somewhat mixed 
concerning the effect it has on financial decision-making (Charness & Gneezy, 2003). Heath 
and Tversky (1991) test whether ambiguity aversion is included only in the games of chance, 
or whether it also extends to uncertainty about knowledge of world events. They find that 
people tend to make a bet based on chance when they do not feel that they possess enough 
information to prefer one outcome to another. Instead they rely on their vague intuition in 
situations where they feel particularly knowledgeable or confident. Their self-confidence can 
therefore trigger ambiguity aversion. In our experiment we use Holt and Laury’s (2002) ten-
paired lottery choice task known as Multiple Price List (see section 4.1), and the subjects can 
easily calculate the expected value of each different outcome. Because they can calculate the 
different probabilities, ambiguity aversion takes a more cautious position when making the 
different choices and we will easier identify more accurate CRRA differences between “Own” 
and “Others” treatment. 
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2.2.2 The illusion of control 
Illusion of control is defined as when a person has a higher belief in his own probability of 
being successful than the objective probability would warrant (Langer, 1975). Is it possible 
that the participant will show an illusion of control when participating in our experiment? In 
our experiment the participants will throw the die themselves. According to Charness and 
Gneezy (2003, p. 7) this can trigger an illusion of control because: “(…) There is a sense that 
some people do have some preference for direct control – for example, many craps players 
care who rolls the dice at the table, and some strongly prefer to roll the dice themselves”. 
Benassi, Rohner, Reynolds, and Sweeney (1981, p. 25) find that “The introduction of 
objectively irrelevant factors (e.g., active involvement) into a chance task will lead people 
nevertheless to perceive (and behave as if) they can exert control over the task”.  
 
2.2.3 The value function of Prospect theory 
In PT the value function separate from the classical function of EUT in two ways (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). The first difference is that the value function of PT is concave for gains, 
convex for losses, but steeper for losses than for gains. The other difference is that there exists 
a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale in PT. This transformation arises because 
small probabilities are overweighted and moderate and high probabilities are underweighted.  
A graph of this value function is presented below (Kambara, 2009): 
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Figure 4 – Prospect theory value function graph 
 
 
2.2.4 Myopic loss aversion (MLA)  
MLA is developed by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and is based on two concepts from 
psychology of decision-making. Firstly investors are assumed to be loss-averse. Loss aversion 
refers to the tendency for individuals to be more sensitive to losses than gains and plays a 
central role in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) descriptive theory of decision-making under 
uncertainty, PT. The second concept that MLA employ is mental accounting (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1985) that refers to the implicit methods individuals use to organize 
and evaluate investments and transactions. In particular, they assume that even long-term 
investors evaluate their portfolios frequently. Risk aversion tend to increase the more frequent 
investors evaluate their portfolio (Fellner & Sutter, 2009). Their motivation to develop MLA 
was triggered by the equity premium puzzle. Mehra and Prescott (1985) observed the average 
real annual yield on Standard and Poor Index to be 7 %, while the average yield on short-term 
debt was less than 1 %. The empirical fact that stocks have outperformed bonds over this 
period can be referred to as the equity premium puzzle (EPP). According to Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995), this enormous discrepancy between return on stocks and fixed income 
securities can be explained by MLA. 
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Mental accounting and loss aversion are well illustrated in the example of Samuelson (1963). 
In this example Samuelson offer a fifty-fifty bet at winning $200 or losing $100 to one of his 
colleagues. The colleague turns the bet down because he would feel the loss of $100 more 
than the gain of $200. At the same time he expresses willingness to take on hundred such bets 
as long as he does not have to watch them be played out. This exemplifies loss aversion, and 
also the kind of mental accounting it can imply. The utility function below captures this 
notion where x represents a change in wealth relative to status quo: 
 
 
(4) 
 
As this example illustrates, compounding any number of this bet greater than one will be 
favourable for a loss-averse decision-maker as long as he does not have to monitor bets to be 
played out.  
 
If we draw a parallel of the above example to a loss-averse investor choosing between stock 
and fixed income securities, the evaluation period will be crucial for the investor’s attitude 
towards the risk of the investment (Ågren, 2005). On the one hand, the stock portfolio will 
seem unattractive to the investor if the portfolio is evaluated on a daily basis. This is because 
stock returns go up almost as often as they go down, and the hurt from losses will overweigh 
the joy of winning. On the other hand, consider a longer evaluation period of say one year. 
Then the same portfolio will appear more attractive for the investor. Hence the risky asset will 
seem more attractive to the investor the longer period he tends to hold it, as long as the 
investment is not evaluated frequently. Relatively risk-free assets do not display losses as 
often as more risky assets and are therefore not affected by MLA in the same extent.  
 
In our experiment we will not focus on how frequent portfolios are evaluated although MLA 
can partly explain how people make decisions under uncertainty (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; 
Gneezy & Potters, 1997). Instead we rely on EUT and Holt and Laury’s (2002) design to 
investigate individuals’ risk attitudes. 
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2.3 Non-monetary motivation 
This chapter focus on the non-monetary motivation that affects risky decisions. EUT is our 
main focus when we characterize the subjects’ risk preferences, but it is also important to 
recognize non-monetary motivation as a possible explanation. For example, a subject might 
not respond in accordance with EUT, but his behaviour might be rational he if he is motivated 
by non-monetary incentives. For instance, a spiteful character could deliberately choose 
lotteries with the lowest expected values when making risky decisions on behalf of others, 
contradictory of EUT. 
 
Usually most of the over-the-counter traders have an incentive contract when administering 
their clients’ money (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2008). For instance, a trader can claim 5 % of 
the clients’ monetary outcome. This type of incentive is according to Eriksen and Kvaløy 
(2009) the most obvious extrinsic motivation. Motivation can also be extrinsic if the 
investment manager feels ashamed about losing his client’s money or if he does not feel he 
has fulfilled the monetary expectations of his client. In this matter, the disutility from losing 
money is not directly linked to the clients’ payoff, but rather to the client’s observation of the 
investment managers’ performance. In our experiment we exclude such monetary incentives 
and hypothesize that there exist intrinsic motivation among investment managers. In contrary 
to extrinsic, intrinsic motivation torments the manager’s conscience when not performing well 
and the manager may feel empathy for his clients even if the client cannot observe his 
performance. Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation contains of other-regarding preferences. 
 
2.3.1 Other-regarding preferences 
Following von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) EUT, most economics assume that self-
interest is the sole motivation for all rational people (Grønn, 2005). But various pioneering 
economists  have pointed out that people tend to care for the well-being of others (Arrow, 
1981; G. S. Becker, 1974; Samuelson, 1993; Sen, 1995; Smith, 1759) and that this may lead 
to important economical consequences (Fehr & Schmidt, 2005). Experimental economists and 
psychologists have gathered substantial evidence over the last two decades which indicates 
that people are strongly motivated by other-regarding preferences and do care for the well-
being of others.
1
 With these evidences in mind, the real question is therefore not whether there 
                                                 
1
 See Fehr & Scmidt (2005) for a review. 
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exist other regarding preferences, but how these preferences impact agents when making 
decisions on behalf of their clients.  
 
From the standard self-interest model, the literature on other-regarding preferences has 
focused on three different departures (Fehr & Schmidt, 2005). In addition to maximizing 
material resources a person may also care about:  
1. The material resources allocated to other persons in a relevant reference group 
(altruism) 
2. Different persons’ fairness of behaviour in a relevant reference group (inequity 
aversion) 
3. The character of the reference agents, i.e. whether the agents have selfish, altruistic, 
fair-minded or spiteful preferences 
 
2.3.1.1 Altruism 
The utility function of an individual suffering from altruism depends on the material resources 
allocated to other agents in a relevant reference group. Altruism is the opposite of selfishness 
and is a form of unconditional kindness (Christoffersen, Johansen, Ariansen, Wetlesen, & 
Saugstad, 1994). In mathematical terms, this means that the first derivate of the utility 
function of an individual with respect to the material resources received by any other agent is 
always strictly positive (Fehr & Schmidt, 2005). The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche 
is critical to this unselfish moral, and states that the social community will suppress the 
altruistic person (Christoffersen, et al., 1994). Nietzsche means that there is no such thing as 
pure altruism, because if a person is pure altruistic he could not encourage others to be 
altruistic, but rather spiteful. In other words he alleges that a person is kind because it would 
make him feel better.  
 
2.3.1.2 Inequity aversion 
Inequity aversion is perhaps a more realistic attitude observed when individuals make 
economical allocations that affect others than just themselves. If an individual in addition to 
his material self-interest increases his utility by allocating material payoffs more equitably, 
then he can be characterized as inequity averse (Fehr & Schmidt, 2005). As long as the 
allocation of additional material resources becomes more equitable, the inequity-averse 
person will value this as positive. Definitions of equity are very important in economic 
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models, and are usually defined as equality of monetary payoffs in experimental games. 
Deviation of equity can be measured in terms of income differences between individuals in 
the same reference group or the individual’s relative share of the overall surplus.  
 
In the case of different person’s fairness of behaviour in a relevant reference group, many 
people deviate from purely self-interested behaviour in a reciprocal manner. On the one hand, 
reciprocity means that in response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and 
more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model (Fehr & Simon, 2000). On the 
other hand, in response to hostile actions, an individual becomes frequently much nastier and 
even brutal. By using conventional game theory it is impossible to incorporate reciprocity in 
an economic model. Since preferences depends on intentions, and not only material payoffs, it 
requires the tools of psychological game theory (Geanakoplos, Pearce, & Stacchetti, 1989). 
 
2.3.1.3 The character of the reference agents 
The third departure of other regarding-preferences is the character of reference agents, i.e. 
whether agents have selfish, altruistic, fair-minded or spiteful preferences. According to 
Levine (1998), a player’s weight on the opponent’s monetary payoff depends both on their 
own coefficient of altruism (or spite), and what their opponent’s coefficients are. For instance 
a person will behave kindly towards an altruistic opponent, but will seek revenge if the 
opponent behaves spiteful. It is important to separate between the intentions of the opponent’s 
actions and not his character (Fehr & Schmidt, 2005). Fehr and Schmidt (2005) claim that 
when separating type and intention, type-based reciprocity can be modelled using 
conventional game theory. 
 
2.3.2 Risk-taking on behalf of others 
Financial institutions often make decisions with uncertain outcome on behalf of their 
customers, the investors. Institutions offer a variety of risk portfolios with different outcomes 
and profits. Although the investors can choose between several investment packages with 
different risk profiles, it is important that the decisions made by the agent reflect the risk 
preference of the client. Given no paternalism,
2
 the optimal decision would be the one 
reflecting the investor’s risk preferences (Daruvala, 2007). This requires an unbiased 
                                                 
2
 “Paternalism” can be defined as “The policy or practice of restricting the freedoms and responsibilities of 
subordinates or dependants in what is considered or claimed to be their best interests” ("Paternalism," 2004). 
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perception of the risk preference of those affected, and that the decision made should perfectly 
reflect that perception. 
 
There have been several experiments conducted on the measurement of risk preferences 
(Carlsson, Daruvala, & Johansson-Stenman, 2005; Gneezy & Potters, 1997; Harrison, et al., 
2005; Holt & Laury, 2002, 2005) but relatively little on how people make decisions on behalf 
of others. As far as we know, the only studies that have investigated the latter issue is 
Daruvala (2007), Chakravarty et al. (2009) and Eriksen and Kvaløy (2009). In contrast to 
Chakravarty et al.(2009), Eriksen and Kvaløy (2009) find that people are less risk-averse 
when investing money on behalf of others than when investing their own money. This result 
supports Brown’s (1965) Risk-as-value hypothesis which states that people perceive 
themselves as more risk-seeking than their peers based on the related assumption that they are 
better than others and that risk-seeking is an admirable characteristic (Shapira, 1995). Thus 
they are more likely to have a higher propensity for risk than others. 
 
Contrary to Eriksen and Kvaløy (2009), Chakravarty et al.’s (2009) results is consistent with 
the Risk-as-feelings hypothesis which states that individuals will predict that other people are 
less risk-averse than themselves and lean to risk neutrality (Hsee & Weber, 1997). This 
hypothesis also suggests that feelings play a much more decisive role in risky decisions than 
the traditional EUT. When faced with a risky choice, people have strong feelings and they 
have difficulty in conceiving that others have the same depth of feelings and therefore the 
prediction for the target leaning to risk neutrality (Daruvala, 2007).  
 
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio (1997) conducted a study of risk-taking with normal, 
healthy subjects and subjects with prefrontal damage
3
 and decisions defects. Their game of 
gambling consisted of four decks of cards; two high payment decks ($ 100) and two low 
payment decks ($ 50). On any given turn, individuals could draw from any of the four decks 
and receive either monetary gains or losses. The high paying decks had a net negative 
expected value due to occasional penalty cards with severe losses. Bechara et al. (1997) found 
that both groups began sampling from all four decks, but avoided the high paying decks 
immediately after drawing penalty cards. Despite a strong desire to win and a thorough 
                                                 
3
 “Prefrontal” is defined as “The gray matter of the anterior part of the frontal lobe that is highly developed in 
humans and plays a role in the regulation of complex cognitive, emotional, and behavioral functioning” 
("Prefrontal cortex," 2010). 
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understanding of the game, the patients returned to the high paying cards more quickly after 
suffering a loss than the non-patients. The result of this tendency was that the patients often 
went “bankrupt”. A possible reason why the patients returned to high payment decks quicker 
than the non-patients can according to Hsee and Weber (1997) be their inability to experience 
fear when drawing a penalty card. If the agents in Chakravarty et al (2009) made cynical 
decisions on behalf of their clients but let their feelings affect decisions made when 
administering their own money, they acted in compliance with the Risk-as-feelings 
hypothesis. 
 
2.3.3 Risk-taking on behalf of a group 
The experiments of Chakravarty et al. (2009) and Eriksen and Kvaløy (2009) are both 
focusing on the principal-agent problem
4
. Charness and Jackson (2009) explored a play where 
one member of each two-person group acted as an agent for this group. He was in charge of 
dictating the play for that group and was therefore responsible for the payoff of the other 
group member. Sequentially, they conducted a play where each subject was independent and 
payoffs were solely based on their own decisions. This game is a variant of Rousseau’s 
classical Stag Hunt game (see e.g. Skyrms, 2004). Charness and Jackson (2009) found that the 
behaviour of about 30 % of the population was sensitive to the issue of being responsible for 
another person’s welfare. In almost 90 % of these cases, the decider played a less risky 
strategy than when his actions only affected him. Their results are consistent with Reynolds, 
Joseph, and Sherwood (2009) who found that people are less risk-averse when making 
decisions that only affect themselves than when making decisions that affect others. A 
consequence of the lessened risk is slightly lower average payoffs that also affect the others in 
the group. The lower payoff is a social cost for the decider since his decisions harvest 
displeasure in the group. A sense of responsibility for the welfare of others has an effect on 
risk taking, is consistent with the principle of responsibility-alleviation
5
 described in Charness 
(2000). 
 
                                                 
4
 A “principal-agent” problem refers to a situation where a principal uses the service of a well-informed agent 
(see e.g. Grønn, 2005). Usually there is worked out a contract between the two parties. Since we have excluded 
monetary incentives, which often are represented in such contracts, we will not delve deeply in agent-principal 
theory.   
5
 A shift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internal impulses towards honesty, loyalty, or 
generosity. This effect is referred to as the responsibility-alleviation effect (Charness, 2000). 
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2.3.4 Gender differences in risk-taking 
A question that is often asked is whether there exist gender differences in risk-taking. One of 
the most common stereotype is that women are more risk averse than men (Charness & 
Gneezy, 2007)
6
. In the experiment of Daruvala (2007) this stereotype is verified in the 
predictions made by both sexes. But when the same subjects made actual choices on behalf of 
others, the results were contrary to the predictions. Nevertheless, there are several empirical 
evidences of gender differences where females tend to take less risk (see e.g. the survey in 
Charness & Gneezy, 2007; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Eckel & Grossman, 2008). Charness and 
Gneezy (2007) direct criticism towards the empirical investigation of gender differences in 
risk-taking because there is a vast variation in the methods used to study this phenomenon. A 
lot of the experimental work, mostly done by psychologists, each uses different decision 
problems which makes it hard to compare the results. Charness and Gneezy (2007) find that 
some papers were specifically designed to test for gender differences and that others found 
gender differences without looking for them.  
 
Although the articles mentioned above find evidences for gender differences, they present 
vague explanations to why this phenomenon occurs. This is probably why the simple majority 
has a perception of the existing stereotype in gender differences. 
 
3 Scientific method 
In this chapter we will explain our theoretical approach to scientific method including 
philosophy of science, qualitative and quantitative methods, research design and secondary 
and primary data. We provide a detailed description and continuously give reasons for why 
we have chosen a causal research design, or more precisely a controlled laboratory 
experiment, to obtain answers to our research questions. Figure 5 presents a model of different 
scientific methods and research designs. 
 
  
                                                 
6
 Even though it is not completely clear how the hunter-gatherer origins map into contemporary financial 
behavior (Charness & Gneezy, 2007), some might argue that the gender difference seems grounded in 
evolutionary psychology, given our role-differentiated hunter-gatherer roots (for evolutionary psychology 
literature, see e.g. Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990, 1992). 
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3.1 Philosophy of science 
In scientific research we mainly distinguish between two different methods; qualitative and 
quantitative (Grønmo, 2004). Qualitative methods origin from the philosophical tradition 
called social constructionism which briefly entails that people’s subjective experiences are 
recognized as valid knowledge (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 2002). Social 
constructionists claim that the phenomenons we are investigating are determined by people’s 
way of perceiving “reality”, rather than objective and external factors. Quantitative methods 
descend from the philosophical tradition called positivism. The key idea of positivism is to 
find causal connections that can be used to predict general behaviour patterns. Contrary to 
social constructionists, positivists stress that the world exists externally, and that its properties 
should be measured through objective methods. 
 
Philosophy 
of science 
Qualitative methods Quantitative methods 
Social 
constructionism Positivsm 
Research design 
 Explorative 
o Interview 
o Focus group 
o Observation 
Research design 
 Descriptive 
o Questionnaire 
o Diary 
o Observation 
 Causal 
o Laboratory experiment 
o Field experiment Secondary data – qualitative methods 
Primary data 
Secondary data – qualitative methods 
Primary data 
Overlap 
Figure 5 – Model of scientific methods and research designs 
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3.2 Quantitative method 
So which method has been used in this master thesis – qualitative or quantitative? According 
to Gripsrud, Olsson and Silkoset (2004) it is the data collected that can be characterized as 
either qualitative or quantitative. We gathered data from decision sheets and questionnaires to 
measure risk aversion and control for demographic effects. Evidently, we have chosen a 
quantitative approach to obtain answers to our research questions. Data collection are 
described in details in chapter 4. 
 
3.3 Research design 
A research design expresses the structure of the research problem and the plan of 
investigation used to obtain empirical evidence with relation to the problem (Phillips, 1976). 
It specifies the methods and procedures for data collection, measurement and data analysis 
(Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Furthermore it is common to distinguish between three main 
categories of research design (Cooper & Schindler, 2001): explorative, descriptive and causal. 
 
Explorative design is used within qualitative research and is consequently not relevant in our 
thesis. Data collection techniques for descriptive design are questionnaires, observations or 
diaries. Hence it is not a suitable design in our study. Even though we make use of a 
questionnaire, the purpose of the questionnaire is however to control for demographic effects. 
To be able to examine possible causal connections we are depending on a causal design, 
which really just means that we use some kind of experiment (Gripsrud, et al., 2004). Since 
we are trying to find possible causal connections for people’s risk attitudes, it is obvious that 
we have adopted a causal design. 
 
3.3.1 Causal design 
In a causal design the, the purpose is to show that one incident (X) is the cause of another 
incident (Y) given the boundary conditions (Z). To achieve this, we have to establish that 
(Cooper & Schindler, 2001): 
 There is correlation between X and Y 
 X happens before Y 
 Other possible causes for correlation are not present (isolation) 
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Transferred to our study, we want to show that treatment (X), i.e. investing money on behalf 
of others, result in either less or more risk-taking (Y) given certain boundary conditions (Z) 
which will be addressed in section 4.2. 
 
The main point in an experiment is to manipulate the explanatory variables in order to see if 
they have any effect on the dependent variable (Gripsrud, et al., 2004). Thus our aim is to 
manipulate the explanatory variable treatment in order to see if that have any effect on the 
dependent variable risk aversion. When researchers intervene in a situation and investigate the 
effect of what they have done, it is per definition always an experiment (Gripsrud, et al., 
2004). The setting can either be in a laboratory or in the field (Harrison & List, 2004). We 
have chosen a laboratory setting because we wanted to isolate the effect of stimuli by 
eliminating noise from the surroundings. 
 
3.3.1.1 Controlled laboratory experiment 
To summarize we have applied a quantitative design in order to obtain answers to our 
research problem, i.e. whether people take more or less risk with other people’s money than 
with their own. Our aim is to find causal connections between the dependent variable risk 
aversion and the explanatory variable treatment. Thus we have chosen a causal design, or 
more exactly a controlled laboratory experiment. In addition, we control for demographic 
effects like sex, education, income etc. that might affect the treatment effect. Pioneers like the 
2002 Nobel Prize winner Vernon L. Smith have established controlled laboratory experiments 
as a recognized scientific method to find answers to economic problems ("The Sveriges 
Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002," 2010). Hence 
controlled laboratory experiments are widely used in economic research
7
, 
 
and they can be 
described by the following criteria (Gripsrud, et al., 2004): 
a) Randomized distribution of subjects in an experiment and a control group 
(randomization) 
b) Manipulation of the experiment group (stimuli) 
c) Takes place in an artificially created setting (laboratory) 
d) Makes it possible to isolate the effect of stimuli because the surroundings can be 
controlled 
e) Can get results that are not valid in natural surroundings 
                                                 
7
 See e.g. Fehr & Schmidt (2005) and Harrison & Rutström (2008) for a review 
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In accordance with the criteria above we carried out the experiment as follows: 
a) Our participants were stochastically8 distributed in two groups; one experiment group 
and one control group. This secured a random distribution of stimuli. 
b) We manipulated the experiment group by offering stimuli to the subjects in this group. 
Consequently, subjects in the control group did not receive any treatment. As 
mentioned above, subjects in the control group invested their own money while 
subjects in the experiment group invested others money. 
c) The experiment took place in a classroom because we wanted to create a copy of the 
real world in an artificial laboratory setting. 
d) The laboratory setting made it possible to isolate the treatment effect due to fully 
control of the surroundings. 
e) However, a laboratory setting might yield results that are not valid in natural 
surroundings (Gripsrud, et al., 2004). One should always question whether the 
surroundings in an artificially created setting can be transferred to the real world as 
people might behave differently in a laboratory, rather than in a natural setting
9
. 
Nevertheless, laboratory experiments are useful because you can isolate other effects. 
 
3.4 Secondary and primary data 
The data that the researcher collects to obtain answers to his problem are usually 
differentiated between primary and secondary data (Grønmo, 2004). Secondary data are 
collected to serve another purpose. The secondary data we make use of in our study are 
existing theories and research on the field, specified in the references. Our two most important 
sources are Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) and Chakravarty et al. (2009) as we have done a 
replication of their experiments. Primary data are gathered by the researcher himself, i.e. our 
primary data consist of data from decision sheets and questionnaires in order to measure risk 
aversion and control for demographic effects. 
 
                                                 
8
 “Stochastic” means ” Randomly determined; that follows some random probability distribution or pattern, so 
that its behaviour may be analysed statistically but not predicted precisely” ("Stochastic," 2004). 
9
 One of the most well-known laboratory experiments in a business context is the Hawthorne experiment where 
the Hawthorne effect was established. In this experiment a group of women were placed in a laboratory to 
execute the manual work they usually did in their daily jobs. The goal of the experiment was to show how 
changes in the number of breaks and the length of these, adjustments of heating and lighting and so on did affect 
productivity. As the study proceeded, the results showed that productivity increased independently of the 
implemented changes. For instance, productivity increased even though lighting was dimmed. The conclusion 
was that the worker’s productivity did not depend on the working conditions and the surroundings but the 
experiment itself. The attention the workers got from the scientists created this effect. 
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Now that we have established and explained why we have used a controlled laboratory 
experiment as our research design in this master thesis, we turn to the data collection process.  
 
4 Data collection 
This chapter focuses on the models and techniques we have used to measure subjects’ risk 
attitudes as well as detailed descriptions of how the experiment was designed and conducted. 
We also present hypotheses based on existing literature and our own assumptions. 
 
4.1 Risk elicitation procedures 
According to Harrison and Rutström (2008), five general elicitation procedures have been 
used to measure risk attitudes from individuals in the laboratory using non-interactive 
settings: 
1. Multiple Price List (see below) 
2. Random Lottery Pairs (Hey & Orme, 1994) 
3. Ordered Lottery Selection (Binswanger, 1980, 1981) 
4. Becker-Degroot-Marshak (G. M. Becker, Degroot, & Marschak, 1964) 
5. Trade-Off (Wakker & Deneffe, 1996) 
 
4.1.1 Multiple Price List (MPL) 
The first to use an MPL design in the context of ascertain individual risk attitudes, is most 
likely Miller, Meyer and Lanzetta (1969). Their subjects faced five alternatives that constitute 
an MPL, even though the alternatives were presented individually over 100 trials. Later the 
method has been used by Schubert, Brown, Gysler, and Brachinger (1999), Barr and Packard 
(2002), Holt and Laury (2002) and Chakravarty et al.(2009). Even though the MPL design has 
faced some criticism because it assumes that EUT holds
10
, Harrison and Rutström (2008, p. 
105) maintain that “(…) One cannot expect any theory to predict perfectly, since any violation 
would lead one to reject the theory no matter how many correct predictions it makes”. Holt 
and Laury’s (2002) MPL design provides a simple test for risk aversion in which each subject 
is presented with ten-paired lottery choice decisions between lottery A and B.  
 
                                                 
10
 Several recent studies, e.g. Gneezy & Potters (1997) and Haigh and List (2005), test EUT directly against the 
alternative MLA hypothesis. Still, their findings can be explained without relying on MLA (Harrison & 
Rutström, 2008). Decreasing relative risk aversion does not reject the EUT in this case.  
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4.2 Experimental design 
We have selected Holt and Laury’s (2002) design since it is the most well-known and 
commonly used baseline experiment within the MPL framing. As far as we know, our study is 
the first besides Chakravarty et al. (2009) to test whether people are risk-averse over other 
people’s money using this specific design11. We first replicated the experiment of Holt and 
Laury (2002) to ensure comparability with data from previous experiments. The replication 
served as a baseline and robustness test of Chakravarty et al.’s (2009) findings on a 
Norwegian sample. 
 
4.2.1 Baseline experiment 
Our baseline experiment, referred to as “Own”12, followed Holt and Laury’s (2002) design 
mentioned above. The subjects in “Own” formed the control group and consequently did not 
receive any treatment. The basic payoff matrix presented to subjects is illustrated in table 1: 
 
Table 1 – Ten-paired lottery choice payoff matrix 
 Lottery A Lottery B    
Decision Prob. Payoff Prob. Payoff Prob. Payoff Prob. Payoff EV(A) EV(B) Payoff 
difference 
1 0.1 75 0.9 60 0.1 145 0.9 4 61.50 18.10 43.40 
2 0.2 75 0.8 60 0.2 145 0.8 4 63.00 32.20 30.80 
3 0.3 75 0.7 60 0.3 145 0.7 4 64.50 46.30 18.20 
4 0.4 75 0.6 60 0.4 145 0.6 4 66.00 60.40 5.60 
5 0.5 75 0.5 60 0.5 145 0.5 4 67.50 74.50 -7.00 
6 0.6 75 0.4 60 0.6 145 0.4 4 69.00 88.60 -19.60 
7 0.7 75 0.3 60 0.7 145 0.3 4 70.50 102.70 -32.20 
8 0.8 75 0.2 60 0.8 145 0.2 4 72.00 116.80 -44.80 
9 0.9 75 0.1 60 0.9 145 0.1 4 73.50 130.90 -57.40 
10 1.0 75 0 60 1.0 145 0 4 75.00 145.00 -70.00 
 
All amounts in table 1 are in Norwegian crowns (NOK). Lottery A is considered to be the safe 
choice, while lottery B is considered to be the risky choice. Decision row 1 implies that 
lottery A offered a 10 % probability of winning NOK 75 and a 90 % probability of winning 
NOK 60. As shown in the third-last column, the expected value for lottery A, EV(A), is NOK 
                                                 
11
 A recent paper by Eriksen & Kvaløy (2009) investigated the same basic question of how people behave when 
taking risk on behalf of others . However, they tested if people behaved consistently with MLA on behalf of 
other people’s money using Gneezy & Potter’s (1997) design as baseline experiment. 
12
 Chakravarty et al. (2009) denote their baseline experiment “Self”. 
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61.50. The expected values and the payoff differences were not given to the subjects. 
Similarly, lottery B offered chances of receiving NOK 145 or NOK 4 in the first decision row 
with an expected value of NOK 18.10. The last column shows that the expected payoff 
difference is NOK 43.40 for decision 1, i.e. a risk-neutral person would prefer lottery A to B 
due to higher expected payoff. The other decisions are similar, except that as one moves down 
the table, the chances of the higher payoff for each option increase. Accordingly, the expected 
value of both lotteries increases, but after row 4 the expected value of lottery B exceeds the 
expected value of lottery A. 
 
The subjects chose either A or B in each row. After the subjects had made a decision for each 
row, they threw a ten-sided die twice. The first throw determined which row to be used, and 
the second throw determined the payoff for that row. The logic behind this test for risk 
aversion is that only risk lovers would choose lottery B in the first row, and only risk-averse 
subjects would choose lottery A in the second last row. Row 10 is basically just to check that 
the subject understood the instructions, and is not relevant in terms of risk aversion. It is 
expected that the majority of the subjects would switch from A to B at some point in the 
matrix, and this switching point can be used to reveal their risk attitude. A risk-neutral subject 
would pick lottery A in the first four rows and then switch to lottery B for the remaining rows 
as he solely base decisions on highest expected value. Although subjects made ten decisions, 
only one random row were selected to be played out to determine payoff. This is a popular 
and widely used procedure (Chakravarty, et al., 2009; Harrison, et al., 2005; Holt & Laury, 
2002, 2005), but not essential. 
 
We have multiplied Holt and Laury’s (2002) baseline prizes by 37.5 times to “change” USD 
into NOK. This implies prize values of NOK 75 and NOK 60 in the safe lottery A, and values 
of NOK 145 and NOK 4 in the risky lottery B
13
. Using the official exchange rate, 1 USD = 
5.89 NOKs at the time of the experiment which yields payoffs of $12.74 and $10.19 in lottery 
A, and payoffs of $24.64 and $0.68 in lottery B
14
. Another way to calculate payoffs is to use 
data that better reflects the purchasing power of the Norwegian Crown in Norway, in terms of 
goods and services. Using purchasing power data from the Penn World Tables (Heston, 
Summers, & Aten, 2009), lottery prizes roughly transfers to $8, $6.4, $15.4 and $0.4, 
                                                 
13
 Holt & Laury’s (2002) prize values were $2, $1.60, $3.85 and $0.1, respectively. 
14
 Daily average interbank rate were USD/NOK = 5.8855 ("Historical Exchange Rates: FXHistory®: Quality 
rates from 1990," 2009), e.g. NOK 75 * 5.8855 = $12.74. 
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respectively, which equal a scaling of 4 times the baseline prizes of Holt and Laury (2002)
15
. 
Taken into account that the subjects’ average earnings in the baseline experiment were NOK 
296.20 for 45 minutes work, we claim that the payments were considerable. Norwegian 
students have a relatively low earning power, receiving about NOK 90 000 a year from the 
State Educational Loan Fund in Norway which converts to about NOK 52 per hour
16
. Still, 
conversion to US dollars at official exchange rates or purchasing power data does not affect 
inferences about risk attitudes from observed choices. 
 
The baseline experiment was held in two sessions, denoted session A and C, in which the 
participants completed two tasks. Task instructions were handed out sequentially so that the 
subjects did not have any information about the nature of the subsequent tasks when 
performing the first task. In the first task, the subjects made ten decisions between lottery A or 
B, and indicated their choices in a decision sheet (see description above). All stochastic draws 
were done by using a ten-sided die. This task aimed at measuring the risk attitudes of the 
subjects. The second task consisted of filling in a questionnaire regarding demographic data. 
Afterwards they were informed about the additional money that they could earn from 
decisions made by a person in the other room, picked at random. At the end of the 
experiment, the subjects received their earnings and signed a receipt before they were asked to 
leave the room. The average earnings of NOK 296.20 can be divided in three; a NOK 100 
participation fee, payoff from decision task 1 and payoff from a stochastically chosen person 
in the other room. We have enclosed complete instructions given to the subjects in “Own” in 
appendix A. 
 
4.2.2 Main experiment  
Our main experiment, referred to as “Others”17, followed like the baseline experiment Holt 
and Laury’s (2002) MPL design. The subjects in “Others” formed the experiment group and 
consequently received treatment. We manipulated the experiment group by telling them to 
take risk on behalf of some unknown person in the other room, picked at random. The basic 
payoff matrix presented to subjects were the exact same as in the baseline experiment. 
                                                 
15
 Purchasing power parity (PPP) implies that the exchange rate between currencies of two countries should be 
equal to the ratio of the countries’ price level of a common bask of goods (Steiner, 2002). The official exchange 
rate in 2007 was close to the exchange rate at the time of the experiment. So PPP exchange rate of USD/NOK = 
9.13 (Heston, et al., 2009), e.g. NOK75/9.13 ≈ $8. 
16
 Assuming standard Norwegian working hours per year: 230 days *7.5 working hours per day = 1725 hours.  
17
 Chakravarty et al. (2009) denote their main experiment “Agent” 
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All the participants in the main experiment received a participation fee of NOK 100. Even 
though the subjects in “Others” earned considerably less than the subjects in “Own”, we still 
think that NOK 100 is a significant sum given the fact that they spent maximum 30 minutes to 
complete the entire task.  
 
The main experiment was held in two sessions, denoted session B and D, in which the 
participants completed two tasks. In compliance with the baseline experiment, task 
instructions were handed out sequentially so that the subjects did not have any information 
about the nature of the subsequent tasks when performing the first task. The nature of the two 
tasks was identical with that of “Own”, apart from one important exception. Contrary to the 
baseline experiment, the subjects were told that their decisions would determine the earnings 
to a stochastically chosen person in the other room. In addition, we made it clear to the 
subjects that the person in the other room was not given this task at all and that his earnings, 
apart from the participation fee, depended solely on their decisions. The complete instructions 
given to the subjects in “Others” can be found in appendix B. 
 
4.2.3 Theoretical predictions 
Like Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1992) we accept that EUT alone cannot explain how 
people make decisions under risk. It is obvious that most people do not make risk-neutral 
choices when they face a problem, but tend to be risk-averse. But it is not possible to 
characterize risk attitude under prospect theory without making some notifications about 
probability weighting and loss aversion, along with the curvature of the utility function 
(Harrison & Rutström, 2008). To be able to measure the subjects’ risk aversion from the data 
in our experiment we will use a suitable statistical model called constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) that complies with EUT and not prospect theory. The mathematical expression of 
utility of income with CRRA can be defined as follows (Holt & Laury, 2002): 
 
 
(5) 
 
where x is the lottery prize and r is the coefficient of CRRA. CRRA is the parameter to be 
estimated and r≠1. r=0 corresponds to risk neutrality, r<0 to risk-loving, and r>0 to risk 
aversion. Let k denote possible outcomes in the lottery and pk denote probability for each 
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outcome (Harrison & Rutström, 2008). Under EUT, the expected utility is the probability 
weighted utility of each outcome in each lottery i: 
 
 
(6) 
 
The expected utility for each lottery pair is calculated for a candidate estimate of r, and the 
index calculated: 
 (7) 
 
The notation EUL and EUR are respectively the “left” and “right” lottery. Using a standard 
cumulative function ( EU), the index based on latent preferences is then linked to the 
observed choice. A cumulative function shows the probability that a stochastic variable is less 
than or equal to a number (Stock & Watson, 2006). Using the function in the figure 6 
(Harrison & Rutström, 2008, p. 70), the cumulative function takes any argument between ±∞ 
and transforms it into any number between 0 and 1, and we get the probit link function 
(Harrison & Rutström, 2008): 
 
 (8) 
 
Figure 6 – Normal and logistic cumulative density functions 
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Figure 6 forms a critical link between observed binary choices, the latent structure generating 
the index y
*
, and the probability of that index y
*
 being observed
18
. Let y
*
 denote the index 
defined in equation (7), and is linked to the observed choices by specifying that the R lottery 
is chosen when ( EU)>0,5, which is also implied in equation (8). In other words the 
horizontal axis is a parameter of expected value of choosing lottery R over L, and the vertical 
axis is a parameter of the probability of choosing lottery R over L. Transferred to our 
experiment, the switch point for choosing lottery B over A would be in decision 5 assuming 
risk neutrality. The likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the EUT and CRRA 
specifications being true, depends on the estimates of r given some functional form for the 
cumulative density function. 
 
4.2.4 Hypotheses 
When defining hypotheses, it is necessary to have a closer look at the findings in former 
studies of risk aversion in laboratory settings. What we find most relevant, is the work of Holt 
and Laury (2002, 2005), Harrison et al. (2005), Chakravarty et al. (2009) and Eriksen and 
Kvaløy (2009). Based on their work and our own assumptions of what might affect risk 
preferences, we have formulated two set of hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses concerns 
individual risk aversion, while the second relate to treatment effect. In addition, we also 
discuss possible demographic effects. 
  
4.2.4.1 Hypothesis 1 – Individual risk aversion 
By individual risk aversion we mean inferred risk attitudes from subjects in the main 
experiment “Own”. Traditionally, people are predicted to be risk-neutral when making 
decisions under uncertainty (Ochs & Roth, 1989; Roth & Malouf, 1979), but research proves 
that subjects are (slightly) risk-averse with “normal” laboratory payoffs and that a few are 
risk-loving (Harrison, et al., 2005; Holt & Laury, 2002, 2005). Based on this we can derive 
the following set of hypotheses: 
H0: Subjects are (slightly) risk-averse when making risky decisions over their own 
money 
H1: Subjects are risk-neutral when making risky decisions over their own money 
 
                                                 
18
 The dashed line and the solid line are normal and logistic cumulative density functions, respectively. 
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When payoffs are scaled up however, subjects become sharply more risk-averse (Holt & 
Laury, 2002). Harrison et al. (2005) replicate and extend the study of Holt and Laury (2002) 
to show that Holt and Laury’s (2002) design is confounded by an order effect19. Although 
Harrison et al. (2005) reaffirm that people become sharply more risk-averse when payoffs are 
scaled up, the increase in risk aversion is due to both order and scale effects. Because the 
subjects always completed the high real payment choice after the low real payment task (order 
effect), the pure scale effects cause smaller increases in risk aversion than suggested by Holt 
and Laury (2002). As a result of the corrections by Harrison et al. (2005), Holt and Laury 
(2005) provided new data without order effects. Nevertheless, we do not consider scale effects 
in our study, but rather use “normal” laboratory payoffs in order to investigate risk aversion. 
 
4.2.4.2 Hypothesis 2 – Treatment effect 
The literature is scant on the fundamental question of how people behave when taking risk on 
behalf of others (Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2009). To our knowledge, only Daruvala (2007), Eriksen 
and Kvaløy (2009) and Chakravarty et al. (2009) have addressed this issue. On the one hand, 
Eriksen and Kvaløy’s (2009) results show that subjects take less risk with other people’s 
money than with their own money. On the other hand Chakravarty et al. (2009) find that there 
is a tendency to exhibit less risk aversion when an individual makes a decision for an 
anonymous stranger. Based on these two studies, the second set of hypotheses can be defined 
as: 
H0: Subjects take the same amount of risk with other people’s money as with their own 
money  
H1: Subjects do not take the same amount of risk with other people’s money as with 
their own money 
 
This hypothesis is the most important in our study. If we can reject the null hypothesis there is 
a significant treatment effect which will either support Eriksen and Kvaløy’s (2009) or 
Chakravarty et al.’s (2009) results. 
 
There is also empirical evidence for demographic effects that affect risk preferences 
(Chakravarty, et al., 2009; Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2009; Harrison, et al., 2005; Harrison & 
Rutström, 2008; Holt & Laury, 2002). This will be thoroughly discussed in section 5.3.5. 
                                                 
19
 An order effect is present when prior experience with one task affects behavior in a subsequent task (Harrison, 
et al., 2005). 
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4.2.5 Experiment procedure 
In total, 80 (undergraduate and graduate) students participated in the experiment which was 
conducted in four sessions. Subjects in sessions A and C took part in the baseline experiment 
“Own” while the subjects in sessions B and D participated in the main experiment “Others”. 
All students were attending the University of Stavanger in Norway at the time of the 
experiment, and were recruited by e-mail. In the e-mail they were invited to join an economic 
experiment in which they had the opportunity to earn a nice sum of money. Like Holt and 
Laury (2002) and Chakravarty et al. (2009) we conducted the experiment using pen and paper 
and physical drawings with a ten-sided die. 
 
In the baseline experiment “Own” we had 40 subjects who took risk on behalf of themselves. 
The 40 subjects who participated in the main experiment “Others” took risk on behalf of 
others. As mentioned, “Own” is a replication of Holt and Laury’s (2002) experiment, and 
“Others” is a replication of Chakravarty et al.’s (2009) experiment. For the “Others” 
experiment we needed 40 more subjects, whose only role was to serve as passive clients and 
receive the payoffs from the agents in “Others”. To save on both time and people we decided 
to use the subjects in “Own” as clients. In sessions A and B, the participants in the baseline 
experiment showed up half an hour before the participants in the main experiment. When the 
agents in “Others” had completed filling in the decision sheets, these were handed to the 
experimenter in “Own” to calculate earnings. Anyhow, the passive clients had to wait for 
quite some time, so based on this experience all subjects showed up at the same time for 
sessions C and D. 
 
As we started the experiment, an envelope with instructions was handed out in a stochastic 
order to ensure that the ID number the subjects received was given to them randomly. The 
agents in “Others” were told that they were matched with a stochastically chosen person in the 
other room at the beginning of the experiment. The clients in “Others” were however not 
informed about this before right at the end of the experiment, and they did not observe the 
choices the agents made on their behalf. All instructions were given both written and verbally 
during the sessions.  
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5 Data analysis and results 
In this chapter we will analyse the data from the experiment, present the results and discuss 
the findings. Firstly we take a closer look at the sample and possible sample selection bias. 
Secondly we report and examine average payoffs, safe choices and implied CRRA intervals in 
order to reveal the subjects’ risk aversion. Thirdly we perform an OLS regression analysis 
based on our findings and draw conclusions concerning possible treatment and demographic 
effects. The data analysis have been conducted with the statistical analysis software SPSS 
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). 
 
5.1 Sample  
Our aim when recruiting subjects to the experiment was primarily to obtain a cross-section of 
all the students at the University of Stavanger, i.e. a representative sample. As mentioned, 80 
subjects participated in the experiment all together. The baseline experiment “Own” was 
conducted in two sessions, A (15 subjects) and C (25 subjects). The main experiment 
“Others” was also conducted in two sessions, B (15 subjects) and D (25 subjects). In addition, 
the 40 subjects in “Own” served as passive clients in “Others”.  
 
As to sex, we had 43 male and 37 female subjects. 22 males and 18 females participated in 
“Own”, while 21 males and 19 females took part in “Others”. We argue therefore that the 
distribution of gender was quite even. 
 
Regarding age, the participants ranged from 20 to 50 years, and the average age was 
approximately 25 years. In “Own” the minimum and maximum age was 20 and 33 years, 
respectively, with 24.5 years on average. The subjects in “Others” ranged from 20 to 50 years, 
and the average age was about 25 years. Considering that both undergraduate and graduate 
students
20
 participated in the experiment, we claim that the sample was representative in terms 
of age.  
 
The participants in the experiment were either undergraduate or graduate students. Both in 
“Own” and “Others”, there were 67.5 % undergraduate and 32.5 % graduate students. 
Concerning field of study, students from all twelve different fields were represented in the 
study, but the vast majority was engineers, economists or teachers. Compared to the 
                                                 
20
 “Undergraduate” refers to Bachelor’s Degree students, while “graduate” refers to Master’s Degree students 
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population, i.e. all the students at the University of Stavanger, class standing and field of 
study are nicely reflected in the data.  
 
Given the arguments above we conclude that the sample is representative. Consequently, the 
results from the studies can be generalized to the population. To ensure that everyone had the 
possibility to participate, the recruitment e-mail was sent to every single student and the 
sessions were not conducted during class time. Complete demographic data can be found in 
appendix D. 
 
5.1.1 Sample selection bias 
Although we maintain that our sample is representative for the population, the sample might 
suffer from bias. Hence sample selection is an important factor in experiments, and Harrison 
and Ruström (2008) underpin that experimental economists should pay much attention to the 
process that leads subjects to participate if they are to draw reliable inferences in settings were 
risk attitudes play a role. 
 
Randomization to treatment is basic to statistical control in the design of experiments 
(Harrison & Rutström, 2008). Randomization bias occurs if the inferred risk preferences from 
our experiment do not represent the risk preferences of the population. Individuals have 
different preferences towards taking on risk, and randomization implies some uncertainty 
about treatment condition. The way laboratory experiments measure treatment effect could be 
directly affected by randomization bias (see e.g. Harrison & List, 2004; Heckman & Smith, 
1995). In the context of an economic experiment, there are two latent sample selection effects 
that might cause this bias (Harrison & Rutström, 2008). Firstly, participants volunteered for 
the experiment, thus it is possible that we attracted people that are least averse to being 
exposed to risk given the inherent risk in randomization to treatment (Harrison, Lau, & 
Rutström, 2009). Secondly, we offered a fixed, non-stochastic participation fee to encourage 
attendance which could tempt more risk-averse subjects to participate (Camerer & Lovallo, 
1999). Cadsby, Song, and Tapon (2007) and Dohmen and Falk (2006) conducted laboratory 
tests of risk attitudes where they allowed subjects to choose between tasks rewarded by fixed 
or performance-variable payments. Since their results show that more risk-averse subjects 
selected tasks with fixed rewards rather than uncertain rewards depending on performance, we 
found that the best solution to escape randomization bias was to offer a non-random show-up 
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fee combined with a random payoff from the lottery choice task. To avoid both least risk-
averse and more risk-averse participants, subjects were only told that they could earn a nice 
sum of money in the recruitment e-mail. This implied that they were guaranteed some 
financial remuneration and that they could possibly earn additional money. 
 
5.1.2 Experimental treatments 
A summary of our experimental lottery-choice treatments is presented in table 2
21
. The table 
shows each subject’s generated payoff and average payoffs in “Own” and “Others”. As to 
average payoffs, we exclude the 100 NOK participation fee. 
 
Table 2 – Summary of lottery choice payoffs 
 Number of subjects   
 Lottery A payoffs Lottery B payoffs   
Treatment NOK 75 NOK 60 NOK 145 NOK 4 
Total number 
of subjects 
Average 
payoffs 
“Own” 8 11 19 2 40 NOK 100.58 
“Others” 6 10 19 5 40 NOK 95.63 
 
It does not appear to be large differences in payoffs in the baseline and the main experiment. 
Although average payoffs are somewhat higher in “Own” than “Others”, this is most likely 
due to chance thus we cannot infer any risk preferences from the table. In order to decide 
whether the subjects in “Own” generally took more risk when deciding over lottery choices 
than the subjects in “Others” (or vice versa) a thorough investigation is needed. This is 
provided in the next section. 
 
5.2 Risk aversion 
A variety of statistical models may be used to analyze the Holt and Laury (2002) data, but 
mainly two models are typically applied to infer individual risk attitudes (Harrison & 
Rutström, 2008). One model e.g. Holt and Laury (2002) use to evaluate the data, is to look at 
the average number of safe choices
22
 for each of the ten-paired lottery choice decisions. 
Another model is the interval regression model used by e.g. Chakravarty et al. (2009). In this 
model, the dependent variable is the CRRA interval that each subject implicitly revealed 
                                                 
21
 For all lottery choices and payoffs, see appendix C. 
22
 Number of safe choices refers to how many times the subject chose the safe lottery A over the risky lottery B. 
Master Thesis in Economic Analysis – Risk-taking on behalf of others: A laboratory experiment 
 
37 
 
when they switched from lottery A to lottery B. We analyse the data from our experiment 
using both of the two models mentioned above.   
 
5.2.1 Risk aversion revealed by safe choices 
Most of the subjects in treatment “Own” and “Others” chose the safe lottery A when the 
probability of the higher payoff was small, and then switched to the risky lottery B without 
ever crossing over to lottery A again. This finding is consistent with existing research 
(Chakravarty, et al., 2009; Harrison, et al., 2005; Holt & Laury, 2002, 2005). In all four 
sessions 16 of 80 persons (20 %) switched back from lottery B to A; 6 subjects in “Own” and 
10 subjects in “Others”. The percentage of switching subjects was therefore somewhat higher 
in “Others” (25 %) compared to “Own” (15 %). Nevertheless, there is still a clear division 
point between clusters of safe and risky choices with only a few “incorrect” choices on each 
side. Thus, the total number of safe choices can be used as an indicator of risk aversion (Holt 
& Laury, 2002). The average proportion of safe choices for each of the ten decisions is 
presented in figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 – Proportion of safe choices in each decision 
 
 
 
The horizontal axis shows the decision row number, and the vertical axis shows the 
probability that the subjects chose A for that decision. The average choice made by the 
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subjects in “Own” and “Others” is represented by the solid blue and red line, respectively. 
The dashed green line indicates predicted choices under a risk-neutral assumption, i.e. a 
probability of 1 that the safe choice is selected for the first four decisions followed by a 
probability of 0 that the risky choice is selected for the remaining six rows. As mentioned 
earlier, a risk-neutral subject pick lottery A until the expected value of lottery B exceeds the 
expected value of lottery A. Subjects that pick the safe option A more than the risk-neutral 
prediction are considered to be risk-averse. 
 
Like Holt and Laury (2002, p. 1648) and Chakravarty et al. (2009, p. 13), our series of choice 
frequencies indicate that the subjects in “Own” tend to be risk-averse as the blue line lies to 
the right of the dashed green, risk-neutral line. However, the average choices of the subjects 
in “Others” seem to deviate from Chakravarty et al.’s figure (2009, p. 13). Consequently, we 
found it necessary to adjust the fraction choosing the safe option A in order to see if that could 
alter our results. What we did was to exclude all 16 subjects who switched back from lottery 
B to A, and the adjusted average proportion of safe choices for each of the ten decisions is 
presented in the figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 – Adjusted proportion of safe choices in each decision 
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If we compare figure 7 with figure 8 we see that there are only minor adjustments to the blue 
line that expresses the “Own” subjects’ average proportion of safe choices. Hence we can still 
maintain that the subjects in “Own” tend to be risk-averse. But if we look at the “Others” 
subjects’ fraction of safe choices, there are some modifications to the red line. Especially for 
the five last decisions, the probability of choosing lottery A in “Others” drops when we 
exclude the subjects that crossed over from the risky to the safe lottery. After this adjustment, 
figure 8 shows the same trend as Chakravarty et al. (2009, p. 13). There are clear indications 
of a more risk-neutral behaviour among subjects in “Others” compared to “Own” as the red 
line lies to the left of the blue line and thus closer to the risk-neutral line.  
 
5.2.2 Risk aversion revealed by CRRA intervals 
The interval regression model has been used to study effects of experimental conditions while 
controlling for characteristics of the sample and the conduct of the experiment (Harrison & 
Rutström, 2008). It was first proposed by Coller and Williams (1999) for an MPL 
experimental task. The implied bounds on the CRRA coefficient can be calculated for each 
row of the payoff matrix (see table 1), and CRRA intervals are as a matter of fact reported by 
both Holt and Laury (2002, p. 1649). Accordingly, risk aversion based on lottery choices from 
our baseline experiment is presented in table 3: 
 
Table 3 – Risk aversion classifications based on safe lottery choices in “Own” 
Number of 
safe 
choices 
Number of 
subjects 
Range of CRRA Risk preference 
classification 
Proportion 
of choices 
Cumulative 
proportion 
of choices 
0-1 0 CRRA < -0.95 Highly risk-loving 0.0 % 0.0 % 
2 1 -0.95 < CRRA < -0.49 Very risk-loving 2.5 % 2.5 % 
3 1 -0.49 < CRRA < -0.15 Risk-loving 2.5 % 5.0 % 
4 9 -0.15 < CRRA < 0.15 Risk-neutral 22.5 % 27.5 % 
5 13 0.15 < CRRA < 0.41 Slightly risk-averse 32.5 % 60.0 % 
6 12 0.41 < CRRA < 0.68 Risk-averse 30.0 % 90.0 % 
7 4 0.68 < CRRA < 0.97 Very risk-averse 10.0 % 100.0 % 
8 0 0.97 < CRRA < 1.37 Highly risk-averse 0.0 % 100.0 % 
9-10 0 CRRA > 1.37 Stay in bed 0.0 % 100.0 % 
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The logic behind the table is that each subjects’ number of safe choices implicitly reveals his 
range of CRRA. This range then corresponds to a certain risk preference classification. For 
example, a subject with three safe choices reveals a CRRA interval from -0.49 to -0.15, and 
can therefore be classified as risk-loving. The second last column to the right shows that 2.5 
% of the subjects in “Own” tend to be risk lovers, and the right column shows that 5% of the 
subjects are at least risk-loving. In compliance with the previous section and Holt and Laury’s 
(2002) results, the majority of the subjects in “Own” seem to be (slightly) risk-averse with a 
CRRA range between 0.15 and 0.41. However, a more formal statistical analysis is required 
before we can draw a conclusion. This is provided in the next section.  
 
Similarly, risk aversion based on lottery choices from our main experiment is described in 
table 4: 
 
Table 4 – Risk aversion classifications based on safe lottery choices in "Others" 
Number of 
safe 
choices 
Number of 
subjects 
Range of CRRA Risk preference 
classification 
Proportion 
of choices 
Cumulative 
proportion 
of choices 
0-1 2 CRRA < -0.95 Highly risk-loving 5.0 % 5.0 % 
2 1 -0.95 < CRRA < -0.49 Very risk-loving 2.5 % 7.5 % 
3 7 -0.49 < CRRA < -0.15 Risk-loving 17.5 % 25.0 % 
4 14 -0.15 < CRRA < 0.15 Risk-neutral 35.0 % 60.0 % 
5 8 0.15 < CRRA < 0.41 Slightly risk-averse 20.0 % 80.0 % 
6 5 0.41 < CRRA < 0.68 Risk-averse 12.5 % 92.5 % 
7 2 0.68 < CRRA < 0.97 Very risk-averse 5.0 % 97.5 % 
8 0 0.97 < CRRA < 1.37 Highly risk-averse 0.0 % 97.5 % 
9-10 1 CRRA > 1.37 Stay in bed 2.5 % 100.0 % 
 
There is a clear tendency that the subjects in “Others” (table 4) tend to be less risk-averse 
compared to the subjects in “Own” (table 3). While subjects in the baseline experiment are 
generally (slightly) risk-averse, subjects in the main experiment appear to be closer to risk-
neutral with an average CRRA interval between -0.15 and 0.15. This is consistent with the 
findings of Chakravarty et al. (2009) and confirms the trend shown in the adjusted average 
proportion of safe choices for each of the ten decisions. Of course, this result only reflects 
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averages, so we have to investigate this issue further before we can conclude that people in 
general tend to take on more risk when making decisions on behalf of others. 
One problem that arises when calculating the CRRA interval is how to interpret subjects who 
switch back and forth between safe and risky choices. Although Holt and Laury (2002) did 
not take this issue into account, Harrison and Rutström (2008) provide a method to deal with 
this problem. We used this method in order to make our data comparable with Chakravarty et 
al. (2009) by adjusting the switching subjects’ estimated CRRA coefficients accordingly. For 
instance, one subject switched from option A to option B after five safe choices, then chose 
option A one more time before switching back to B for the remaining four rows. Although 
such subjects provide less precise information than subjects that only switch once (Harrison & 
Rutström, 2008), this implies that he revealed a CRRA interval between 0.15 and 0.97. After 
calculating the CRRA intervals for all the 16 switching subjects in “Own” and “Others”, we 
have the data necessary to estimate the dependent variable in a regression model.  
 
5.2.3 Individual risk aversion based on safe choices and CRRA 
As discussed earlier, the findings in the two previous sections strongly indicate that people in 
general tend to be (slightly) risk-averse when making decisions under uncertainty. Average 
number of safe choices, range of CRRA and risk preference classification is presented in table 
5. For comparison, we have included results from former experiments. 
 
Table 5 – Individual risk aversion classifications based on safe lottery choices 
Experiment Safe 
choices 
Range of CRRA Risk preference 
classification 
Holt and Laury (2002) 5.2 0.15 < CRRA < 0.68 (Slightly) risk-averse  
Harrison et al. (2005) 5.3 0.15 < CRRA < 0.68 (Slightly) risk-averse 
Holt and Laury (2005) 5.7 0.15 < CRRA < 0.68 (Slightly) risk-averse 
Chakravarty et al.’s (2009) 
baseline experiment ”Self”  
6.4 0.41 < CRRA < 0.97 (Very) risk-averse 
Our baseline experiment “Own” 5.2 0.15 < CRRA < 0.68 (Slightly) risk-averse 
 
All the experiments in the left column are based on Holt and Laury’s (2002) MPL design, and 
the first three experiments from the top used the original payoffs of $2, $1.60, $3.85 and $0.1. 
Chakravarty et al.’s (2009) prize values on the other hand were $65, $52, $125 and $3.25, 
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while we used payoffs of $8, $6.4, $15.4 and $0.4
23
. The second column from the left shows 
average number of safe choices for each experiment, and according to Holt and Laury (2002, 
p. 1649) these numbers imply range of CRRA and corresponding risk preference 
classifications. For example, 5.2 safe choices imply a CRRA interval between 0.15 and 0.68 
which can be classified as slightly risk-averse to risk-averse.  
  
Consistent with Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) and Harrison et al. (2005), we find that people in 
general are (slightly) risk-averse with “normal” laboratory payoffs. Chakravarty et al. 
(2009)’s subjects are (very) risk-averse, but this can be explained by higher prize values with 
a scaling of 32.5 times the baseline prizes of Holt and Laury (2002). As mentioned earlier, 
people become sharply more risk-averse when payoffs are scaled up (Harrison, et al., 2005; 
Holt & Laury, 2005). Descriptive statistics from our experiment shows that the average 
CRRA estimate in “Own” is 0.28 (standard deviation = 0.36), i.e. they reveal slightly risk-
averse preferences. Thus we can reject the null hypothesis that people are risk-neutral when 
making decisions under uncertainty: 
 
Result 1. Subjects are (slightly) risk-averse when making risky decisions over their own 
money. 
 
In order to decide if there are significant treatment and demographic effects that effect 
individual risk aversion, we now turn to the regression analysis.  
 
5.3 Regression analysis 
For simplicity, we have used an OLS regression model instead of the interval regression 
model. Since the interval regression model is just an extension of OLS (Harrison & Rutström, 
2008), we do not expect this to result in large differences. First we will describe the 
theoretical assumptions of the model and then we will provide the results from the OLS 
regression. In the end we will test if the assumptions hold.  
 
5.3.1 Theoretical assumptions 
Most applied economics is concerned with analysing data in order to unveil general behaviour 
patterns that helps us understand the past, and possibly in predicting the future (Sydsæter & 
                                                 
23
 These prize values are calculated using purchasing power data (see section 4.2.1 for details).  
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Hammond, 2008). For example, price and quantity data for a certain commodity like gas may 
be used to estimate a demand curve. Again, this might be used to predict how future price 
changes will affect demand. The most common technique for estimating such a curve is OLS. 
The estimator that minimizes the sum of squared residuals is called the OLS estimator (see 
e.g. Stock & Watson, 2006). OLS is a method for estimating the unknown parameters in a 
linear regression model. This method minimizes the sum of squared distances between the 
observed responses in the dataset, and the responses predicted by the linear approximation. 
Closeness is measured by the sum of the square mistakes made in prediction Y given X. The 
example below shows a multiple regression model with k explanatory variables.  
 
 (9) 
 
The regression model contains the intercept ( 0), explanatory variables ( k), the error term (ui) 
and Yi is i
th
 observation of the dependent variable. Xki are the i
th
 observation of each of the k 
regressors. k is the slope coefficient of Xki and is the expected change in Yi resulting from 
changing Xki holding all other X’s constant. The intercept 0 is simply the expected value of Y 
when all the X’s equal 0. In order to draw any inferences to the population based on a sample 
when using OLS, there are several assumptions that have to be fulfilled (Stock & Watson, 
2006): 
 
1. The conditional distribution of ui given Xi has a mean of zero 
The residual contains “other factors”, and the assumption is a formal mathematic 
statement which asserts that these factors are unrelated to Xi in the sense that, given a 
value of Xi, the mean of the distribution of these other factors is zero. This can be 
expressed mathematically: E (ui | Xi) = 0. Below is an illustration of a homoscedastic error 
term ui  (Stock & Watson, 2006, p. 127). The variance of the conditional distribution of ui 
given Xi is constant for i = 1,….,n and in particular does not depend on Xi.  
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Figure 9 – Conditional probability distributions and population regression line (homoscedasticity) 
 
 
The figure shows the conditional probability of test scores for districts with class sizes of 
15, 20 and 25 students. The mean of the conditional distribution of test scores, given the 
student-teacher ratio, E (Y | X), is the population regression line 0 + 1X1. At a given 
value of X, Y is distributed around the regression line and the error, u = Y – ( 0 + 1X1), 
has a conditional mean of zero for all values of X. 
 
2.  Independently and identically distributed 
Assumes that (Xi,Yi), i =1,…,n are independently and identically distributed across the 
observations. This means that all the observations must be drawn by simple random 
sampling form a single large population.  
 
3. Large outliers are unlikely: 
Simply states that observation of Xi and Yi made far outside the usual range of the data are 
unlikely. In other words the X and Y have finite kurtosis. The result of large outliers is 
meaningless values of 1. An illustration the sensitivity of OLS to large outliers is shown 
in figure 10 (Stock & Watson, 2006, p. 130). 
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Figure 10 – The sensitivity of OLS to large outliers 
 
 
4. No perfect multicollinearity: 
Presence of perfect multicollinearity makes it impossible to compute the OLS estimator. 
None of the regressors can be a perfect linear function of another. If so, the regressors are 
said to be perfect multicollinear.  
 
5.3.2 OLS regression model 
The dependent variable in our regression model is the calculated CRRA coefficient r 
 for each subject. Following Holt and Laury (2002), CRRA coefficients are found by simply 
calculating the mean of the CRRA intervals (see e.g. Frijns, Koellen, & Lehnert, 2008). For 
instance, the CRRA coefficient is 0.545 for a risk-averse subject that has range of CRRA 
between 0.41 and 0.68. The explanatory variables are treatment, female, parents’ income, 
father’s education and mother’s education. Our goal is primarily to see if there is a significant 
treatment effect and sequentially if the introduction of demographic variables alters the 
possible treatment effect. The results from the OLS regression are presented in table 6: 
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Table 6 – Multiple regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Constant relative risk aversion coefficient (CRRA) 
      
Regressors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Treatment -0.264* -0.269** -0.266* -0.279* -0.315** 
 (0.105) (0.103) (0.115) (0.113) (0.115) 
      
Female  0.208* 0.222 0.222 0.157 
  (0.104) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) 
      
Parents’ income   0.170 0.261* 0.289* 
   (0.123) (0.130) (0.131) 
      
Father’s education    -0.138 -0.113 
    (0.074) (0.076) 
      
Mother’s education     -0.105 
     (0.075) 
      
Intercept 0.282** 0.188* 0.095 0.354* 0.511* 
 (0.075) (0.087) (0.103) (0.173) (0.205) 
      
Summary statistics      
SER 0.471 0.462 0.469 0.461 0.457 
R
2
 0.074 0.120 0.161 0.204 0.229 
 0.062 0.097 0.121 0.153 0.166 
      
*   statistically significant at the 5 % level (p-value = 0.05)   
** statistically significant at the 1 % level (p-value = 0.01) 
  
 
The first five rows show the beta coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of the 
regressors. If the beta coefficients have a negative sign, they have negative effect on the 
dependent variable and vice versa. Negative effect on the dependent variable implies a lower 
estimated CRRA coefficient and therefore less risk-aversion. The intercept is presented in row 
six. Regarding the regressors, they are defined as follows: 
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 Treatment: 0 = subjects in “Own”, 1 = subjects in “Others” 
 Female: 0 = male, 1 = female 
 Parents’ income: 0 = parents earned less than NOK 999 000, 1 = parents earned more 
than NOK 1 000 000 
 Father’s education: 1 = upper secondary school or less, 2 = bachelor’s degree or 
equivalent (1-3 years of higher education), 3 = master’s degree or equivalent (4-5 
years of higher education), 4 = doctor’s degree 
 Mother’s education: same scale as father’s education 
 
The summary statistics in the last three rows describe how well the OLS regression line fits 
the data. High measures of fit means that the regressors account for much of the variation in 
the dependent variable, and that the observations are tightly clustered around the regression 
line (see e.g. Stock & Watson, 2006). SER means the standard error of the regression, R
2
 is 
the coefficient of determination and is the adjusted R
2
. SER is an estimator of the standard 
deviation of the regression error ui. It is a measure of how far the observation Yi typically is 
from the predicted value, i.e. the regression line. R
2
 measures the fraction of the sample 
variance of Yi that is explained by Xi, and it ranges between 0 and 1. R
2 
equal to 1 means that 
all of the variance of the dependent variable is explained by the explanatory variables and 
conversely. Unless the estimated coefficient on the added regressor is exactly zero, R
2
 always 
increases when a new variable is added in a multiple regression. So an increase in R
2
 does not 
mean that adding a variable actually improve the fit of the model. One way to correct for this 
is to use adjusted R
2
, because it adjusts R
2
 according to sample size and number of 
explanatory variables. 
 
As table 6 shows we have calculated five different models, adding one more regressor for 
each column. There seems to be a clear treatment effect, significant at the 1-5 % level, even 
when we control for demographic effects. This means that subjects in treatment “Others” 
exhibit less risk-aversion than in treatment “Own”. The negative beta coefficients of father’s 
and mother’s education indicate that subjects whose parents have some higher education take 
on more risk than others, but these beta coefficients are not significant. Consequently, we 
cannot say that this effect is statistically valid. Females and high-earning parents seem to take 
less risk than men and medium/low-earning parents. However, we must investigate these two 
effects further before we can draw a conclusion. In order to decide which of the five models 
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that is best fitted to explain the variation in the CRRA coefficient, we have to compare the 
models with respect to SER and adjusted R
2
. Model 5 have the highest measures of fit due to 
the lowest SER and highest adjusted R
2
. An F-statistic test also shows that the explanatory 
variables are statistically significant at the 5 % level
24
.  
 
5.3.3 Test of theoretical assumptions 
To test if the OLS assumptions hold, we have used the statistical analysis software SPSS 
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) to evaluate model 5. As explained in section 5.3.1 
there are four assumptions in a linear regression with multiple regressors: the conditional 
distribution of ui given Xi has a mean of zero, independently and identically distributed, large 
outliers are unlikely and no perfect multicollinearity. 
 
To check if the conditional distribution of ui given Xi has a mean of zero, we can look at a 
histogram that displays the regression standardized residuals and the bell-shaped indication 
normal distribution curve: 
 
Figure 11 – Histogram of regression standardized residuals and normal distribution curve  
 
                                                 
24
  Critical value of an F distribution with q = 4 restrictions and n = 80 is 2.49.  
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A comparison of the regression standardized residuals and the normal distribution curve 
indicate that the residuals are normally distributed. In addition, we can look at a normal 
probability plot of the regression standardized residuals: 
 
Figure 12 – Normal probability plot of the regression standardized residuals 
 
Perfectly normally distributed residuals should follow the sloping line, while observed 
residuals are indicated with circles. Figure 12 above also suggests that the standardized 
residuals are normally distributed because the observed residuals follow the line closely with 
no considerable deviations. Evidently, assumption one holds; the conditional distribution of ui 
given Xi has a mean close to zero. Based on the normal probability plot we can also infer that 
assumption three holds: large outliers are unlikely. 
 
The next step is to control for homoscedasticity. One way to do this is to look at a scatter plot 
of standardized residuals as a function of predicted values of the dependent value: 
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Figure 13 – Scatterplot of the regression standardized residuals and predicted values 
 
 
As shown in the figure, there are no clear implications of sharply increasing or decreasing 
variance. This tells us that the homoscedasticity assumption holds: the variance of the 
conditional distribution of ui given Xi does not depend on Xi. 
 
The second assumption states that all the observations must be drawn by simple random 
sampling from a single large population. Following our controlled laboratory experimental 
design and the discussion in section 5.1, we claim that subjects are independently and 
identically distributed.  
Assumption four assumes no perfect multicollinearity. To decide whether the data suffers 
from multicollinearity, we can use the variance inflation factor (VIF). VIF measures how 
much the variance of an estimated beta coefficient increase due to collienearity and should not 
exceed a value of 5 (Gripsrud, et al., 2004) . As VIFs range between 1.07 and 1.30, there are 
no signs of perfect multicollinearity in the data. None of the regressors are a perfect linear 
function of another.   
 
After testing the theoretical assumptions, we conclude that the OLS regression model holds. 
Nevertheless, further statistical analyses are imperative to decide whether the treatment and 
demographic effects are significant. Since the sample is relatively small with 40 subjects in 
each treatment, we cannot use the parametric t-test to verify these results (Wenstøp, 2006). 
Instead we use non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-tests. 
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5.3.4 Treatment effect 
In this section we present the main findings related to treatment effect in our experiment. 
Table 7 displays descriptive statistics of safe choices and CRRA. 
  
Table 7 – Average safe choices and CRRA estimates for treatments “Own” and “Others” 
 Treatment “Own” Treatment “Others” Mann-Whitney U-test 
Test variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. z-value p-value 
Safe choices 5.23 1.14 4.33 1.62 -3.09 0.00 
CRRA 0.28 0.36 0.02 0.56 -2.68 0.01 
 
The table presents the mean and standard deviation for the average amount of safe choices 
and range of CRRA in treatment “Own” and “Others”. It also gives the Mann-Whitney z-
values and corresponding two-tailed p-values for differences in amount of safe choices and 
differences in the degree of CRRA between the two treatments. In both treatments the sample 
size is 40 subjects. 
 
We have averaged the amount of safe choices and the degree of CRRA from both treatments 
and compared them. We use non-parametric statistical tests in order to determine the 
statistical validity of these differences. The results present both the z-value, which are 
transformations of the U-statistic given by the Mann-Whitney U-test, and the p-value. In our 
second set of hypothesis, the null hypothesis predicts no systematic differences between 
treatments while the alternative hypothesis predicts systematic differences between treatments 
with an unknown direction of the differences. Thus we use p-values that are given for two-
tailed significance levels.  
 
There is a highly significant treatment effect for both safe choices and CRRA (p<0.01). Based 
on these findings we can reject the null hypothesis. Thus we have: 
 
Result 2. Subjects take more risk with other people’s money than with their own money. 
 
This reaffirms the findings of Chakravarty et al. (2009) and contradicts the result of Eriksen & 
Kvaløy (2009). In order to compare in-sample responses, Chakravarty et al. (2009) let their 
subjects either make decisions over their own money first, and then over another person’s 
money, or vice versa. Thus our findings serve as a robustness check because we let different 
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people perform the tasks in the baseline and main experiment. Chakravarty et al. (2009)’s 
results are seemingly not confounded by an order effect. If we assume that subjects exhibit 
less feelings over their clients’ money than their own, our second result supports the Risk-as-
feelings hypothesis in the population from which our sample is drawn.   
 
There are several possible reasons why our result contradicts the result of Eriksen and Kvaløy 
(2009). They conducted a repeated game based on Gneezy and Potters’ (1997) design, and 
find that people behave consistently with MLA over their clients’ money and take less risk 
with their clients’ money than with their own. In contrast to a repeated game, we replicated 
Chakravarty et al.’s (2009) study, which is a single played game. Therefore our subjects did 
not have the opportunity to exhibit MLA. While Eriksen and Kvaløy (2009) conducted a fully 
computerized experiment, our subjects used pen and paper and threw the die themselves. This 
could possibly trigger an illusion of control (see e.g. Langer, 1975), making the subjects in 
“Others” less risk-averse on behalf of their clients. In addition, our design is based on EUT, 
while their design is based on PT. The different framing could also be a possible answer to the 
contradictory findings. Our design had a focal point between choice 4 and 5 in order to be 
risk-neutral and the risk-rate and lottery winnings were fixed. But in Eriksen and Kvaløy’s 
(2009) experiment the risk-rate and amount of investments were set by the subjects 
themselves and a focal point was nonexistent. Their subjects could therefore experience loss 
aversion when loosing the invested money which can trigger a higher degree of risk aversion 
in subsequent decisions.  
  
5.3.5 Demographic effects 
In the OLS regression model we also controlled for demographic effects in order to see if they 
affected the treatment effect. The following section focuses on possible gender and income 
effects in risk-taking. Although Chakravarty et al. (2009) prove that subjects whose parents 
have some higher education take less risk than other subjects, we do not consider parents’ 
education. As the regression model clearly show the beta coefficients of father’s and mother’s 
education are far from significant with p-values of 0.14 and 0.16, respectively. 
 
5.3.5.1 Gender effect 
As to gender, Holt and Laury (2002) find that men in general are slightly less risk-averse than 
women, but this finding has later been rejected (Harrison, et al., 2005; Harrison & Rutström, 
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2008). Eriksen and Kvaløy (2009) and Chakravarty et al.(2009) reaffirm that there are no 
gender effect when people take risk on their own behalf. However, Eriksen and Kvaløy 
(2009) find that men exhibit MLA behaviour over other people’s money to a larger extent 
than women. Our results indicate that women might be more risk-averse than men. In order to 
test the statistical validity of this finding, we look at the sub-samples on gender in both 
treatments using a Mann-Whitney two-sided U-test. 
Table 8 presents the mean and standard deviation for the average amount of safe choices and 
CRRA estimates of both sexes in treatment “Others”. It also give the Mann-Whitney z-values 
and corresponding two-tailed p-values for differences in amount of safe choices and CRRA 
estimates between men and women in treatment “Others”. The gender distribution in “Others” 
was 21 male and 19 female. 
 
Table 8 – Average safe choices and CRRA estimates for men and women in “Others” 
 Treatment “Others” 
Men 
Treatment “Others” 
Women 
Mann-Whitney U-test 
Test variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. z-value p-value 
Safe choices 3.90 1.84 4.79 1.23 -2.01 0.05 
CRRA -1.71 0.68 -0.37 0.35 -1.54 0.12 
 
According to the table men in treatment “Others” take significantly more risk than women in 
terms of safe choices. While the mean of men’s safe choices is 3.90 with a standard deviation 
of 1.84, women’s mean of safe choices is 4.79 with a standard deviation of 1.23. The Mann-
Whitney two-sided U-test shows a significant gender difference at the p < 0.05 level for the 
amount of safe choices, but the gender difference is not significant for the CRRA estimates 
(p<0.12). Evidently, there is a week gender effect in the “Others” treatment. In treatment 
“Own” the difference was not statistically significant, supporting existing research 
(Chakravarty, et al., 2009; Harrison, et al., 2005; Harrison & Rutström, 2008)
25
.  
 
Several former laboratory studies conclude that women are more risk-averse than men (see 
e.g. Eckel & Grossman, 2008). If we assume the gender stereotype, which states that men are 
less emotional than women, this indicates a support for the absence of Risk-as-feelings within 
men. However, the mean of CRRA estimates used in the Mann-Whitney two-sided U-test is 
                                                 
25
 Results from the Mann-Whitney two-sided U-test in treatment “Own” are reported in appendix F. 
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adjusted for subjects who switched back and forth between safe and risky choices. Hence the 
CRRA coefficient is more reliable to affirm a possible gender effect and our conclusion is that 
gender effect is nonexistent. 
 
5.3.5.2 Income effect 
Following Chakravarty et al. (2009), the income level of parents do affect the people’s risk 
attitudes. They find that subjects whose parents have a medium income level are more risk-
averse than others (p-value = 0.05). To investigate this issue we divided the subjects into two 
groups; high income versus medium/low income. Our definition of high income is: total 
amount of gross (pre-tax) income earned in 2009 by the subjects’ parents higher than NOK 
1 000 000. There were a total of 22 subjects in the high income category. 46 subjects had 
medium/low-earning parents who earned less than NOK 1 000 000. We had 12 missing 
subjects who either did not know, or did not want to answer this question. Again we use a 
Mann-Whitney two-sided U-test to check for differences between the two sub-samples in 
table 9:  
 
Table 9 – Average safe choices and CRRA estimates for high versus medium/low income 
 High income Medium/low income Mann-Whitney U-test 
Test variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. z-value p-value 
Safe choices 5.00 1.16 4.46 1.59 -1.38 0.17 
CRRA 0.26 0.32 0.04 0.56 -1.56 0.12 
 
The Mann-Whitney two-sided U-test generates p-values>0.05 so we do not have statistical 
evidence of a high income effect. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Existing experimental literature on risk-taking have until recently focused on choices that 
only affects the decision-maker (see e.g. the survey in Harrison & Rutström, 2008). Assuming 
”normal” laboratory payoffs, people in general tend to be (slightly) risk-averse when making 
decisions under uncertainty. This is consistent with previous findings (Harrison, et al., 2005; 
Holt & Laury, 2002, 2005) and rejects the traditional risk-neutral prediction. But when 
payoffs are scaled up, people become sharply more risk-averse (Harrison, et al., 2005; Holt & 
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Laury, 2002, 2005). Surprisingly though, the literature is scant on the fundamental question of 
how people behave when taking risk on behalf of others. Our experiment is a contribution to 
this field.  
 
We find that people in general tend to be significantly less risk-averse when making risky 
decisions over other people’s money than over their own. Assuming that agents exhibit less 
feelings over their principals’ money than over their own, our result supports the Risk-as-
feelings hypothesis. This reaffirms the findings of Chakravarty et al. (2009) and contradicts 
the result of Eriksen and Kvaløy (2009). In order to compare in-sample responses, 
Chakravarty et al. (2009) let their subjects either make decisions over their own money first, 
and then over another person’s money, or vice versa. Thus our findings serve as a robustness 
check because we let different people perform the tasks in the baseline and main experiment. 
Chakravarty et al. (2009)’s results are seemingly not confounded by an order effect. 
 
There are several possible reasons why our result contradicts the result of Eriksen and Kvaløy 
(2009). They conducted a repeated game based on Gneezy and Potters’ (1997) design, and 
find that people behave consistently with MLA over their clients’ money and take less risk 
with their clients’ money than with their own. In contrast to a repeated game, we replicated 
Chakravarty et al.’s (2009) study, which is a single played game. Therefore our responders 
did not have the opportunity to exhibit MLA. While Eriksen and Kvaløy (2009) conducted a 
fully computerized experiment, our subjects used pen and paper and threw the die themselves. 
This could possibly trigger an illusion of control (see e.g. Langer, 1975), making the subjects 
in “Others” less risk-averse on behalf of their clients. In addition, our design is based on EUT, 
while their design is based on PT. The different framing could also be a possible answer to the 
contradictory findings. Our design had a focal point between choice 4 and 5 in order to be 
risk-neutral and the risk-rate and lottery winnings were fixed, while in Eriksen and Kvaløy’s 
(2009) experiment the risk-rate and amount of investments were set by the subjects 
themselves and a focal point was nonexistent. Their subjects could therefore experience loss 
aversion when loosing the invested money, which can trigger a higher degree of risk aversion 
in the subsequent decisions.  
 
We found that gender had a significant effect on the number of safe choices in treatment 
“Others”, but the effect was not significant in terms of CRRA. The mean of CRRA estimates 
used in the Mann-Whitney two-sided U-test was adjusted for subjects who switched back and 
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forth between safe and risky choices. Hence we find the CRRA to be more reliable to affirm 
gender effect, and our conclusion is that the gender effect is nonexistent. We do not find any 
other significant demographic effects. 
 
Further research should strive for a better understanding of what motivates agents acting on 
behalf of others. An experiment where the design makes it possible to measure the effect of 
non-monetary motivation such as other-regarding preferences is advisable. New findings may 
shed light on the importance of other-regarding preferences, and help mutual funds improve.  
Investment managers in mutual funds will then be able to identify their clients’ risk 
preferences better and act in accordance with them. Another area of interest is to identify the 
reasons why individuals leave agents to make risky decisions on their behalf since our study 
and research shows that the agents’ risk attitudes differ from the clients’ risk attitudes 
(Chakravarty, et al., 2009; Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2009). It could also be interesting to conduct a 
field experiment in which the clients know the investment managers and compare the results 
with recent findings.  
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Appendix 
A – Instructions sessions A and C, baseline experiment “Own” 
 
 
Welcome to this economic experiment 
 
 
This is a study of economic decision making. You will be paid NOK 100 for your 
participation, but you will earn additional money. How much you will earn depend on the 
choices you make and chance. The instructions are simple and we ask you to pay close 
attention. 
 
The problems are not designed to test you. What we want to know is what choices you make 
in them. The only right answer is what you really would choose. That is why the problems 
give you the chance of earning real money. You will be paid in cash today, at the end of the 
session.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The tasks will proceed in two short parts. 
 
Part 1 is a decision problem in which chance plays a part. The first task requires you to make 
choices, and this is described in details in a moment. This part will result in additional 
earnings over the NOK 100 participation fee. 
 
Part 2 consists of a few questions about you. This information is for research use only. The 
published results of our research will not identify you, or the choices you made in any way. In 
fact, we will only identify you on these sheets by a numeric ID, and that ID will not appear on 
the sheet that has your name for our payment records. 
 
We expect the entire task to take approximately 45 minutes.  
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions during the session. 
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Part 1 Decision task 
 
 
Your decision sheet shows ten decisions listed on the left. Each decision is a paired choice 
between “Option A” and “Option B.” You will make a choice on each row and record these in 
the right column. Your decisions will determine your payoffs from this decision task. 
 
As we started the experiment you received an envelope with instructions in a random order. 
This ensures that the ID number that you have received, and that is listed in the top left corner 
of your decision sheet, was given to you randomly. 
 
We will now perform the next task, where your decisions will determine how much you will 
earn in addition to the participation fee. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine payoffs. The faces are numbered from 0 
to 9, and we will use the 0 face of the die to serve as 10. Look at Decision 1 at the top. Option 
A pays NOK 75 if the throw of the ten sided die is 1, and it pays NOK 60 if the throw is 2-10. 
Option B yields NOK 145 if the throw of the die is 1, and it pays NOK 4 if the throw is 2-10. 
 
The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of the 
higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will 
not be needed since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is 
between NOK 75 or NOK145.  
 
After you have made all of your choices, you will throw this die twice, once to select one of 
the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to determine what the payoff is for the option 
you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected. Even though you will make ten 
decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in 
advance which decision will be used. 
 
When you are finished, we will come around and let you perform the die throws. 
 
Please fill in the decision sheets now. We kindly ask you not to talk to each other when you 
perform this task.  
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ID number: __________ 
 
 
Decision sheet 
 
 
Decision Option A Option B 
Your choice 
(circle A or B ) 
1 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 2-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 2-10 
A B 
2 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-2, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 3-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-2, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 3-10 
A B 
3 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-3, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 4-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-3, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 4-10 
A B 
4 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-4, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 5-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-4, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 5-10 
A B 
5 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-5, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 6-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-5, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 6-10 
A B 
6 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-6, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 7-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-6, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 7-10 
A B 
7 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-7, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 8-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-7, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 8-10 
A B 
8 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-8, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 9-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-8, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 9-10 
A B 
9 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-9, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-9, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 10 
A B 
10 NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-10 NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-10 A B 
 
 
Decision row chosen by first throw of the die:   __________ 
 
Throw of the die to determine payment:    __________ 
 
Your earnings:       __________ NOK 
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ID number: ______________ 
 
 
Part 2 Some questions about you 
 
 
In this survey most of the questions asked are descriptive. We will not be grading your 
answers and your responses are completely confidential. Please think carefully about each 
question and give your best answers.  
 
 
 
 
1. What is your age? _____________ years 
 
2. What is your sex? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Male 
02 Female 
 
3. What was or is your undergraduate major? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Health professions 
02 History and culture 
03 Hotel and tourism management 
04 Sports 
05 Engineering 
06 Teacher training 
07 Media  
08 Music and dance 
09 Scientific subjects 
10 Social science 
11 Language and literature 
12 Economics 
 
4. If you are a graduate student, what is your class standing? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 First year Master’s 
02 Second year Master’s 
 
5. What was the highest level of education that your father (or male guardian) 
completed? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Upper secondary school or less 
02 Bachelor’s degree or equivalent (1-3 years of higher education) 
03 Master’s degree or equivalent (4-5 years of higher education) 
04 Doctor’s degree 
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6. What was the highest level of education that your mother (or female guardian) 
completed? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Upper secondary school or less 
02 Bachelor’s degree or equivalent (1-3 years of higher education) 
03 Master’s degree or equivalent (4-5 years of higher education) 
04 Doctor’s degree 
 
7. What is your marital status? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Single 
02 Married 
03 Separated, divorced or widowed 
 
8. What is your average grade at the University of Stavanger? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 A 
02 B 
03 C 
04 D 
05 E 
06 F 
 
9. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of gross (pre-tax) 
income earned in 2009 by your parents? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Less than NOK 400 000 
02 Between NOK 400 000 and 599 000  
03 Between NOK 600 000 and 799 000 
04 Between NOK 800 000 and 999 000  
05 Above NOK 1 000 000 
06 Do not want to answer 
07 Do not know 
 
10. Do you currently smoke cigarettes? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Yes 
02 No 
 
If yes, approximately how much do you smoke in one day? _______ cigarettes 
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Finalization 
 
 
In today’s experiment what you earn, in addition to what you have already earned, will be 
decided by choices made by a person in the other room, picked at random. The decisions 
made by this person are identical with those of part 1, but the earnings will go to you and not 
the person who made the choices. 
 
When you are finished we kindly ask you to hand in the questionnaire and sign a receipt to 
receive the money you have earned in cash before you can leave the room. 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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RECEIPT 
 
 
I verify that I have participated in an economic experiment on _________________________              
and received the following earnings in compensation: 
 
 
Total:     ____________ NOK 
 
 
 
Name (block letters):  _________________________________________ 
 
 
Date of birth (6 digits): _________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Signature:   _________________________________________ 
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B – Instructions sessions B and D, main experiment “Others” 
 
 
Welcome to this economic experiment 
 
 
This is a study of economic decision making. You will be paid NOK 100 for your 
participation. The instructions are simple and we ask you to pay close attention. 
 
The problems are not designed to test you. What we want to know is what choices you make 
in them. The only right answer is what you really would choose. You will be paid in cash 
today, at the end of the session.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The tasks will proceed in two short parts. 
 
Part 1 is a decision problem in which chance plays a part. The first task requires you to make 
choices, and this is described in details in a moment. 
 
Part 2 consists of a few questions about you. This information is for research use only. The 
published results of our research will not identify you, or the choices you made in any way. In 
fact, we will only identify you on these sheets by a numeric ID, and that ID will not appear on 
the sheet that has your name for our payment records. 
 
We expect the entire task to take approximately 30 minutes.  
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions during the session. 
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Part 1 Decision task 
 
 
Your decision sheet shows ten decisions listed on the left. Each decision is a paired choice 
between “Option A” and “Option B.” You will make a choice on each row and record these in 
the right column. Your decisions will determine the payoffs from this decision task to one 
person in the other room, picked at random. The person in the other room is not given a task 
at all. Apart from the participation fee of NOK 100, his or her earnings depend only on your 
decision. 
 
As we started the experiment you received an envelope with instructions in a random order. 
This ensures that the ID number that you have received, and that is listed in the top left corner 
of your decision sheet, was given to you randomly. You will be matched with a randomly 
chosen person in the other room. We will not reveal to you who this person is, however, to 
guarantee that person’s anonymity. 
 
We will now perform the next task, where your decisions will determine the payoffs to one of 
the persons in the other room. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine payoffs. The faces are numbered from 0 
to 9, and we will use the 0 face of the die to serve as 10. Look at Decision 1 at the top. Option 
A pays NOK 75 if the throw of the ten sided die is 1, and it pays NOK 60 if the throw is 2-10. 
Option B yields NOK 145 if the throw of the die is 1, and it pays NOK 4 if the throw is 2-10. 
 
The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of the 
higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will 
not be needed since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is 
between NOK 75 or NOK145.  
 
After you have made all of your choices, you will throw this die twice, once to select one of 
the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to determine what the payoff is for the option 
you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected. Even though you will make ten 
decisions, only one of these will end up affecting the earnings of one of the persons in the 
other room, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used. 
 
When you are finished, we will come around and let you perform the die throws. 
 
Please fill in the decision sheets now. We kindly ask you not to talk to each other when you 
perform this task. 
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ID number: __________ 
 
 
Decision sheet 
 
 
Decision Option A Option B 
Your choice 
(circle A or B ) 
1 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 2-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 2-10 
A B 
2 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-2, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 3-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-2, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 3-10 
A B 
3 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-3, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 4-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-3, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 4-10 
A B 
4 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-4, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 5-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-4, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 5-10 
A B 
5 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-5, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 6-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-5, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 6-10 
A B 
6 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-6, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 7-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-6, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 7-10 
A B 
7 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-7, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 8-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-7, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 8-10 
A B 
8 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-8, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 9-10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-8, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 9-10 
A B 
9 
NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-9, 
NOK 60 if throw of die is 10 
NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-9, 
    NOK 4 if throw of die is 10 
A B 
10 NOK 75 if throw of die is 1-10 NOK 145 if throw of die is 1-10 A B 
 
 
Decision row chosen by first throw of the die:   __________ 
 
Throw of the die to determine payment:    __________ 
 
Earnings:        __________ NOK 
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ID number: ______________ 
 
 
Part 2 Some questions about you 
 
 
In this survey most of the questions asked are descriptive. We will not be grading your 
answers and your responses are completely confidential. Please think carefully about each 
question and give your best answers.  
 
When you are finished we kindly ask you to hand in the questionnaire and sign a receipt to 
receive the participation fee in cash before you can leave the room. 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
 
1. What is your age? _____________ years 
 
2. What is your sex? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Male 
02 Female 
 
3. What was or is your undergraduate major? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Health professions 
02 History and culture 
03 Hotel and tourism management 
04 Sports 
05 Engineering 
06 Teacher training 
07 Media  
08 Music and dance 
09 Scientific subjects 
10 Social science 
11 Language and literature 
12 Economics 
 
4. If you are a graduate student, what is your class standing? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 First year Master’s 
02 Second year Master’s 
 
5. What was the highest level of education that your father (or male guardian) 
completed? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Upper secondary school or less 
02 Bachelor’s degree or equivalent (1-3 years of higher education) 
03 Master’s degree or equivalent (4-5 years of higher education) 
04 Doctor’s degree  
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6. What was the highest level of education that your mother (or female guardian) 
completed? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Upper secondary school or less 
02 Bachelor’s degree or equivalent (1-3 years of higher education) 
03 Master’s degree or equivalent (4-5 years of higher education) 
04 Doctor’s degree 
 
7. What is your marital status? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Single 
02 Married 
03 Separated, divorced or widowed 
 
8. What is your average grade at the University of Stavanger? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 A 
02 B 
03 C 
04 D 
05 E 
06 F 
 
9. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of gross (pre-tax) 
income earned in 2009 by your parents? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Less than NOK 400 000 
02 Between NOK 400 000 and 599 000  
03 Between NOK 600 000 and 799 000 
04 Between NOK 800 000 and 999 000  
05 Above NOK 1 000 000 
06 Do not want to answer 
07 Do not know 
 
10. Do you currently smoke cigarettes? (Circle one number.) 
 
01 Yes 
02 No 
 
If yes, approximately how much do you smoke in one day? _______ cigarettes  
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RECEIPT 
 
 
I verify that I have participated in an economic experiment on _________________________              
and received the following earnings in compensation: 
 
 
Total:     ____________ NOK 
 
 
 
Name (block letters):  _________________________________________ 
 
 
Date of birth (6 digits): _________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Signature:   _________________________________________ 
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C – Lottery choices and payoffs 
 
 
Session A – Baseline experiment ”Own” 
 
Key: S = safe choice (lottery A) 
  
 
R = risky choice (lottery B) 
  
     
 
Safe choices Decision Risk preferance Range of CRRA  
 
0 RRRRRRRRRR 
highly risk-loving 
CRRA < -1.71 
 
1 S / RRRRRRRRR -1.71 < CRRA < -0.95 
 
2 SS / RRRRRRRR risk-loving -0.95 < CRRA < -0.49 
 
3 SSS / RRRRRRR slightly risk-loving -0.49 < CRRA < -0.15 
 
4 SSSS / RRRRRR risk-neutral -0.15 < CRRA < 0.15 
 
5 SSSSS / RRRRR slightly risk-averse 0.15 < CRRA < 0.41 
 
6 SSSSSS / RRRR risk-averse 0.41 < CRRA < 0.68 
 
7 SSSSSSS / RRR very risk-averse 0.68 < CRRA < 0.97 
 
8 SSSSSSSS / RR highly risk-averse 0.97 < CRRA < 1.37 
 
9 SSSSSSSSS / R stay in bed CRRA > 1.37 
 
 
 
Subject Safe choices Decision Payoff (NOK) 
A1 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 60 
A2 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 60 
A3 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 60 
A4 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 60 
A5 5 RSRSRSS / RRS 145 
A6 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 75 
A7 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 145 
A8 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 145 
A9 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 4 
A10 7 SSSSSSS / RRR 145 
A11 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 145 
A12 7 SSSSSRS / RRR 145 
A13 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 145 
A14 7 SSSSSSS / RRR 75 
A15 4 SRSRSS / RRRR 145 
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Session B – Main experiment ”Others” 
 
 
Key: S = safe choice (lottery A) 
  
 
R = risky choice (lottery B) 
  
     
 
Safe choices Decision Risk preferance Range of CRRA  
 
0 RRRRRRRRRR 
highly risk-loving 
CRRA < -1.71 
 
1 S / RRRRRRRRR -1.71 < CRRA < -0.95 
 
2 SS / RRRRRRRR risk-loving -0.95 < CRRA < -0.49 
 
3 SSS / RRRRRRR slightly risk-loving -0.49 < CRRA < -0.15 
 
4 SSSS / RRRRRR risk-neutral -0.15 < CRRA < 0.15 
 
5 SSSSS / RRRRR slightly risk-averse 0.15 < CRRA < 0.41 
 
6 SSSSSS / RRRR risk-averse 0.41 < CRRA < 0.68 
 
7 SSSSSSS / RRR very risk-averse 0.68 < CRRA < 0.97 
 
8 SSSSSSSS / RR highly risk-averse 0.97 < CRRA < 1.37 
 
9 SSSSSSSSS / R stay in bed CRRA > 1.37 
 
 
 
Subject Safe choices Decision Payoff (NOK) 
B1 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 145 
B2 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 4 
B3 3 SRSRRS / RRRR 4 
B4 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 145 
B5 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 60 
B6 4 RRRRRSSSS / R 75 
B7 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 75 
B8 3 SSS / RRRRRRR 145 
B9 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 145 
B10 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 60 
B11 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 145 
B12 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 60 
B13 7 SSSSSSS / RRR 145 
B14 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 145 
B15 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 4 
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Session C – Baseline experiment ”Own” 
 
Key: S = safe choice (lottery A) 
  
 
R = risky choice (lottery B) 
  
     
 
Safe choices Decision Risk preferance Range of CRRA  
 
0 RRRRRRRRRR 
highly risk-loving 
CRRA < -1.71 
 
1 S / RRRRRRRRR -1.71 < CRRA < -0.95 
 
2 SS / RRRRRRRR risk-loving -0.95 < CRRA < -0.49 
 
3 SSS / RRRRRRR slightly risk-loving -0.49 < CRRA < -0.15 
 
4 SSSS / RRRRRR risk-neutral -0.15 < CRRA < 0.15 
 
5 SSSSS / RRRRR slightly risk-averse 0.15 < CRRA < 0.41 
 
6 SSSSSS / RRRR risk-averse 0.41 < CRRA < 0.68 
 
7 SSSSSSS / RRR very risk-averse 0.68 < CRRA < 0.97 
 
8 SSSSSSSS / RR highly risk-averse 0.97 < CRRA < 1.37 
 
9 SSSSSSSSS / R stay in bed CRRA > 1.37 
 
 
Subject Safe choices Decision Payoff (NOK) 
C1 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 75 
C2 3 SSS / RRRRRRR 60 
C3 7 SSSSSSS / RRR 75 
C4 5 SSSRS / RRRRR 145 
C5 4 SRRSSRRS / RR 145 
C6 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 4 
C7 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 60 
C8 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 75 
C9 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 145 
C10 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 145 
C11 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 75 
C12 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 145 
C13 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 145 
C14 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 75 
C15 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 60 
C16 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 145 
C17 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 145 
C18 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 145 
C19 5 SSSSRS / RRRR 60 
C20 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 60 
C21 2 SS / RRRRRRRR 145 
C22 6 SSSSSS / RRRR 60 
C23 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 60 
C24 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 145 
C25 7 SSSSSSS / RRR 75 
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Session D – Main experiment ”Others” 
 
Key: S = safe choice (lottery A) 
  
 
R = risky choice (lottery B) 
  
     
 
Safe choices Decision Risk preferance Range of CRRA  
 
0 RRRRRRRRRR 
highly risk-loving 
CRRA < -1.71 
 
1 S / RRRRRRRRR -1.71 < CRRA < -0.95 
 
2 SS / RRRRRRRR risk-loving -0.95 < CRRA < -0.49 
 
3 SSS / RRRRRRR slightly risk-loving -0.49 < CRRA < -0.15 
 
4 SSSS / RRRRRR risk-neutral -0.15 < CRRA < 0.15 
 
5 SSSSS / RRRRR slightly risk-averse 0.15 < CRRA < 0.41 
 
6 SSSSSS / RRRR risk-averse 0.41 < CRRA < 0.68 
 
7 SSSSSSS / RRR very risk-averse 0.68 < CRRA < 0.97 
 
8 SSSSSSSS / RR highly risk-averse 0.97 < CRRA < 1.37 
 
9 SSSSSSSSS / R stay in bed CRRA > 1.37 
 
Subject Safe choices Decision Payoff (NOK) 
D1 3 SSRRRSR / RRR 145 
D2 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 145 
D3 0 RRRRRRRRRR 145 
D4 3 SSS / RRRRRRR 60 
D5 5 RRSRSSSRS / R 60 
D6 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 145 
D7 1 RS / RRRRRRRR 4 
D8 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 60 
D9 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 4 
D10 3 SSS / RRRRRRR 145 
D11 2 SS / RRRRRRRR 145 
D12 6 SSSRSSRS / RR 75 
D13 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 75 
D14 3 SSS / RRRRRRR 145 
D15 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 145 
D16 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 60 
D17 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 145 
D18 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 60 
D19 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 145 
D20 4 SSSS / RRRRRR 75 
D21 3 RSRRSRS / RRR 145 
D22 4 SSSRS / RRRRR 60 
D23 7 SSSSSRSS / RR 75 
D24 5 SSSSS / RRRRR 145 
D25 9 SR / SSSSSSSS 60 
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D – Demographic data 
 
 
Demographic data codes 
 
In the following tables, the subject number is on the left, and the demographic data codes are: 
 
(A) Age: What is your age? 
(B) Gender: What is your sex? 0 = male, 1 = female 
(C) Field of study: What was or is your undergraduate major? 1 = health professions,  
2 = history and culture, 3 = hotel and tourism management, 4 = sports,  
5 = engineering, 6 = teacher training, 7 = media, 8 = music and dance, 9 = scientific 
subjects, 10 = social science, 11 = language and literature, 12 = economics 
(D) Class standing: What is your class standing? 1 = bachelor, 2 = 1st year master’s,  
3 = 2
nd
 year master’s 
(E) Father’s education: What was the highest level of education that your father (or male 
guardian) completed? 1 = upper secondary school or less, 2 = bachelor’s degree or 
equivalent (1-3 years of higher education), 3 = master’s degree or equivalent (4-5 
years of higher education), 4 = doctor’s degree 
(F) Mother’s education: What was the highest level of education that your mother (or 
female guardian) completed? 1 = upper secondary school or less, 2 = bachelor’s 
degree or equivalent (1-3 years of higher education), 3 = master’s degree or equivalent 
(4-5 years of higher education), 4 = doctor’s degree 
(G) Marital status: What is your marital status? 0 = single, 1 = married 
(H) Average grade: What is your average grade at the University of Stavanger? 1 = A,  
2 = B, 3 = C, 4 = D, 5 = E, 6 = F 
Parents’ earnings: Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of 
gross (pre-tax) income earned in 2009 by your parents? 1 = less than NOK 400 000,  
2 = between NOK 400 000 and 599 000, 3 = between NOK 600 000 and 799 000,  
4 = between NOK 800 000 and 999 000, 5 = above NOK 1 000 000, 6 = do not want 
to answer, 7 = do not know 
(I) Parents’ earnings: Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of 
gross (pre-tax) income earned in 2009 by your parents? 1 = less than NOK 400 000,  
2 = between NOK 400 000 and 599 000, 3 = between NOK 600 000 and 799 000,  
4 = between NOK 800 000 and 999 000, 5 = above NOK 1 000 000, 6 = do not want 
to answer, 7 = do not know 
(J) Smoker: Do you currently smoke cigarettes? 0 = no, 1 = yes 
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Demographic data for sessions A and B 
 
Column key: Age (A), gender (B), field of study (C), class standing (D), father’s education 
(E), mother’s education (F), marital status (G), average grade (H), parents’ earnings (I), 
smoker (J). See data codes on previous page. 
 
 
Subject ID A  B C D E  F  G H I J 
A1 23 0 6 1 1 2 0 3 5 0 
A2 21 1 1 1 2 1 0 4 2 0 
A3 32 0 3 3 2 1 0 3 1 1 
A4 22 1 6 1 1 3 0 2 3 0 
A5 33 1 11 1 1 1 0 2 2 0 
A6 23 0 5 2 3 2 0 4 5 0 
A7 20 1 10 1 1 1 0 2 4 0 
A8 24 1 12 3 3 3 0 2 5 0 
A9 22 0 6 1 3 3 0 2 5 0 
A10 21 1 10 1 2 2 0 2 5 0 
A11 29 1 - 1 2 1 0 3 - 0 
A12 22 1 10 1 1 2 0 3 - 0 
A13 22 1 6 1 2 3 0 2 5 0 
A14 23 0 5 2 3 1 0 3 - 0 
A15 23 0 6 1 2 3 0 3 3 1 
B1 20 1 6 1 1 1 0 2 3 0 
B2 26 1 6 1 3 3 0 3 - 0 
B3 25 0 2 3 1 1 0 1 2 0 
B4 24 0 7 1 3 3 0 3 - 0 
B5 23 0 9 1 3 2 0 3 3 0 
B6 23 1 12 3 3 1 0 2 - 0 
B7 22 1 4 1 3 2 0 3 - 0 
B8 24 1 6 1 2 3 1 1 2 0 
B9 35 1 12 1 1 1 0 3 3 0 
B10 25 1 12 3 2 2 0 2 - 0 
B11 26 1 3 3 1 1 1 2 5 0 
B12 22 1 5 1 1 1 0 3 4 0 
B13 22 1 5 1 2 1 0 3 3 0 
B14 29 0 5 1 1 2 0 4 1 0 
B15 29 0 12 3 3 3 0 1 5 0 
 
  
Master Thesis in Economic Analysis – Risk-taking on behalf of others: A laboratory experiment 
 
83 
 
Demographic data for session C 
 
Column key: Age (A), gender (B), field of study (C), class standing (D), father’s education 
(E), mother’s education (F), marital status (G), average grade (H), parents’ earnings (I), 
smoker (J). See data codes on previous page. 
 
 
Subject ID A  B C D E  F  G H I J 
C1 25 0 5 3 3 2 0 2 3 0 
C2 32 0 5 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 
C3 21 1 8 1 4 2 0 2 5 0 
C4 28 1 6 2 2 3 0 2 - 0 
C5 27 0 5 3 3 2 0 3 2 0 
C6 26 1 12 3 2 2 0 - 5 0 
C7 24 0 5 1 2 1 0 4 2 1 
C8 25 0 6 1 2 1 0 2 - 1 
C9 25 0 12 3 2 2 0 2 5 0 
C10 30 1 10 3 1 2 0 2 5 0 
C11 32 1 12 1 3 3 1 3 - 0 
C12 24 0 5 1 2 1 0 2 4 0 
C13 20 0 5 1 1 2 0 3 3 0 
C14 23 0 12 1 2 1 0 3 3 0 
C15 23 0 5 1 3 2 0 3 3 0 
C16 23 1 5 1 1 2 0 3 4 0 
C17 25 0 7 1 2 2 0 3 4 0 
C18 27 0 5 2 1 3 0 2 4 1 
C19 22 0 5 1 2 4 0 3 5 0 
C20 27 0 9 1 3 1 0 2 5 0 
C21 25 0 5 2 2 2 0 2 3 0 
C22 23 1 3 1 2 3 0 3 3 0 
C23 20 1 11 1 3 3 0 4 5 1 
C24 23 1 5 2 1 1 0 3 3 0 
C25 23 0 5 1 1 2 0 2 4 0 
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Demographic data for session D 
 
Column key: Age (A), gender (B), field of study (C), class standing (D), father’s education 
(E), mother’s education (F), marital status (G), average grade (H), parents’ earnings (I), 
smoker (J). See data codes on previous page. 
 
 
Subject ID A  B C D E  F  G H I J 
D1 21 1 3 1 1 2 0 2 - 1 
D2 23 1 12 1 1 1 0 2 2 0 
D3 23 0 5 1 4 4 0 2 4 0 
D4 48 0 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 0 
D5 34 1 10 3 2 1 0 2 4 0 
D6 24 1 12 3 3 2 0 2 5 0 
D7 20 0 1 1 2 1 0 3 2 0 
D8 24 1 12 2 1 1 0 2 3 0 
D9 24 0 12 3 1 3 0 2 3 0 
D10 21 0 5 1 2 2 0 2 5 0 
D11 23 0 5 2 3 2 0 1 4 0 
D12 25 0 5 1 1 1 0 3 4 0 
D13 22 0 5 1 2 2 0 4 5 0 
D14 24 0 5 1 1 2 0 3 4 0 
D15 26 0 5 1 2 2 0 3 4 0 
D16 20 1 7 1 2 3 0 2 3 0 
D17 25 0 5 2 3 1 0 1 5 0 
D18 23 0 5 1 1 1 0 4 2 0 
D19 26 0 5 1 2 2 0 3 5 0 
D20 22 0 5 2 2 2 0 3 5 0 
D21 50 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 0 
D22 21 1 11 1 2 1 0 4 5 0 
D23 21 1 11 1 1 1 0 4 2 0 
D24 24 0 5 2 1 1 0 3 3 0 
D25 20 0 5 1 2 1 0 2 2 0 
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E – Descriptive statistics 
Here are the descriptive statistics from the baseline experiment “Own” and the main 
experiment “Others”. For demographic data codes, see appendix D. 
 
Baseline experiment “Own” 
 
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. dev. 
Safe choices 40 2 7 5.23 1.14 
CRRA 40 -0.72 0.83 0.28 0.36 
Age 40 20 33 24.58 3.50 
Class standing 40 1 3 1.50 0.78 
Father’s education 40 1 4 2 0.82 
Mother’s education 40 1 4 2 0.82 
Grade 39 1 4 2.59 0.72 
Parent’s earnings 34 1 5 3.71 1.27 
 
 
Histograms of safe choices and CRRA with normal distribution curve 
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Main experiment “Others” 
 
 N Min Max Mean Std. dev. 
Safe choices 40 0 9 4.33 1.62 
CRRA 40 -1.71 1.37 0.02 0.56 
Age 40 20 50 25.23 6.42 
Class standing 40 1 3 1.53 0.82 
Father’s education 40 1 4 1.90 0.87 
Mother’s education 40 1 4 1.70 0.82 
Grade 40 1 4 2.5 0.88 
Parent’s earnings 34 1 5 3.35 1.32 
 
 
Histograms of safe choices and CRRA with normal distribution curve 
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F – Average safe choices and CRRA estimates for men and women in “Own” 
 
 
 Treatment “Own” 
Men 
Treatment “Own” 
Women 
Mann-Whitney U-test 
Test variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. z-value p-value 
Safe choices 5.05 1.25 5.44 0.98 -0.87 0.38 
CRRA 0.23 0.40 0.34 0.30 -0.78 0.44 
 
 
